Case Digest: Go-Tan vs. Tan

Sharica Mari Go-Tan vs. Spouses Perfecto and Juanita Tan

G.R. No. 168852

September 30, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner Sharica filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against her husband,Steven, and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."

Respondents contend that they cannot be included in the charge since they are not among the personalities liable as enumerated under the said law by virtue of “expresio unius est exclusion alterius.”

Ruling:

The Court ruled in favor of petitioner with regard to the inclusion of the respondent spouses.

A provision of the said law expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC (Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262), which allowed legal principles developed in the RPC may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. 9262.

Citing jurisprudence, the court held that the “principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators”.

Furthermore, Section 5 of R.A. 9262 recognizes the acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another

The maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application in the case at bar since it is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction” and not of universal application nor is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent when not plainly indicated.

However, proving conspiracy is a matter of evidence and can be best decided after fullblown trial on the merits.

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Case Digest: People vs. Agulay

G.R. No. 181747

People vs. Narciso Lopez Agulay

September 26, 2008

Facts:

Lower Courts found accused appellant guilty of illegal sale and illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Accused-appellants questioned the means and method the police undertook the operation and the credibility of the prosecution witness.

Ruling:

The dissent maintains that the chain of custody rule "would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence x x x." This means that all persons who came into contact with the seized drugs should testify in court; otherwise, the unbroken chain of custody would not be established.

The Court disagree. Not all people who came into contact with the seized drugs are required to testify in court. 

The integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. The accused-appellant in this case bears the burden to make some showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and a presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties.

After a thorough review of the records of the case, the court found that the chain of custody of the seized substance was not broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized in this case. The non-presentation of witnesses of other persons such as the evidence custodian and the officer on duty was not a crucial point against the prosecution.  Unless there was proof to the contrary, the entries in the documents are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated and they need not testify thereon.

The Court found accused appellant guilty of the illegal sale of drugs but not of the possession of dangerous drugs on account of the second and third sachets alleged to have been retrieved from him after the sale of the first since it could not be done so without being properly charged therewith.

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Case Digest: People vs Dela Cruz; People vs. Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 181545

People vs. Mark Dela Cruz

October 08, 2008

Facts:

Appellant Mark Dela Cruz was found guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 after he allegedly sold prohibited drugs to the poseur-buyer. The prohibited drugs were handed to appellant by companions identified to be an alias Amay and an alias Tabo. Appellant denied the charge and said that he was arrested after refusing to give information about Amay, whom the police were after. His testimony was corroborated by other witnesses.

Lower court gave weight to the testimony by the poseur-buyer and upheld the presumption of regularity in the operation conducted by the officers.

Appellant appealed, questioning the identity of the shabu allegedly confiscated from him in view of Section 21 (1) of RA No. 9165 (inventory of seized drugs) and Section 21 (3) of the same law(certification of the forensic laboratory examination results).

Ruling:

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.

Citing jurisprudence, the failure of the police to comply with the procedure in the custody of the seized drugs raised doubt as to its origins.

The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. TheCourt believed that the prosecution failed to clearly establish the chain of custody of the seized plastic sachets, containing shabu from the time they were first allegedly received until they were brought to the police investigator. There were no records to show that the procedural requirements in Section 21 were complied with.

The presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the constitutional right of presumption of evidence in view of the circumstances. “The presumption of regularity is merely just that--a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.”

The appellant was acquitted.

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Case Digest: People vs. Dela Cruz; People vs. Carlos Dela Cruz

G.R. No 182348

People vs. Carlos Dela Cruz

November 20, 2008

Facts:

Accused- appellant Carlos Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11(2) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Accused-appellant was arrested together with a certain Boy Bicol, who was subject to a warrant of arrest. The two were talking in a nipa hut hideout when the warrant of arrest against Boy Bicol was served. Having been on the scene, accused-appellant was also arrested. On the scene were shabu and firearms, found atop the table and in drawers.

Accused-appellant denied that the guns and drugs were in his possession. Accused-appellant was acquitted for illegal possession of firearms but was convicted for illegal possession of prohibited drugs.

Accused appellant  appealed, claiming that the presence of all the elements of the offense of possession of dangerous drug was not proved beyond reasonable doubt since both actual and constructive possessions were not proved. 

Ruling:

The Court reversed the lower court’s decision and acquitted the accused-appellant

In all these cases, the accused was held to be in constructive possession of illegal drugs since they were shown to enjoy dominion and control over the premises where these drugs were found.

Citing jurisprudence, accused-appellant couldn’t have been in constructive possession of the items since he is not he owner of the nipa hut subject to the warrant nor did he exercise dominion or control over the said hut.

Since accused-appellant was not in possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicol's nipa hut, his subsequent arrest was also invalid by virtue of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest (Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.)

His arrest, independent of the buy-bust operation targeting Boy Bicol, was therefore not lawful as he was not proved to be committing any offense.

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Case Digest: People vs.Ted Miguel Batoon and Melchor Miguel Batoon

G.R. No 184599

People vs.Ted Miguel Batoon and Melchor Miguel Batoon

November 24, 2010

Facts:

Accused-appellants Teddy Batoon and Melchor Batoon were found guilty of violating Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 after they sold a sachet to a poseur-buyer in a buy-operation and after 3 more sachets were found in their possession.

Teddy and Melchor appealed the decision, questioning the chain of custody over the alleged confiscated prohibited drugs and Melchor’s conviction for illegal possession of shabu. 

Ruling:

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.

The Court held that the buy-bust operation was valid and that there had been no showing in the records that the chain of custody was broken.

For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following elements must be established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Although the three sachets containing shabu were found solely in the possession of Teddy, it was evident that Melchor had knowledge of its existence. Records regarding the transaction between the poseur-buyer, Teddy and melchor showed that the accused-appellants conspired in the illegal-business of drugs.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt against accused-appellants were held to have been successfully adduced. 

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Case Digest: People vs. Macabare

G.R. No. 179941

People vs. Lito Lopez Macabare

August 24, 2009

Facts:

Accused appellant Lito Macabare, a detention prisoner, was found guilty of violation of  Section 16 of RA 6425, as amended, after a 410.6 grams of white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu was found in his Cell (in which he was the sole occupant) during a surprise check by the police.

Macabare denied ownership of the item found in his cell. He further claimed that the ‘coleman’ where the shabu was found in could have been owned by somebody else since there had been various inmates who also sleep in his cell. Macabare contended that he shouldn’t be convicted based on mere circumstancial evidence.

Lower courts found him guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and a fine of 5million which was reduced to 500,000.

Ruling:

                Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision.

To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person.

The circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to conclude that Macabare indeed owned the contraband. Moreover, the prosecution was able to show Macabare’s liability under the concepts of disputable presumption of ownership(The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence) and constructive possession(when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found).

The Court also held that although it is true that the presumption of innocence assumes primacy over the presumption of regularity, it cannot be applied in the case at bar since the circumstantial evidence imputing animus posidendi to Macabare over the prohibited substance found in his kubol coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions constitutes proof of guilt of Macabare beyond a reasonable doubt

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Case Digest: People vs. Sembrano

G.R. No. 185848

People Vs. Michael Castro Sembrano

August 16, 2010

Facts:

In a buy-bust operation and after a follow up search, Accused Appellant was arrested and charged with the violation of Section 5 (illegal sale) and Section 11, Article II (illegal possession) of R.A. 9165. He was then found guilty by the lower courts.

Accused-appellant appealed the lower court’s ruling, contending that the arrest made on him was illegal and thus the alleged evidence seized during such warrantless arrest shouldn’t have been admitted (‘fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine”). He further averred that he had been framed by the police officers.

Ruling:

The court held that the arrest made was legal. Appellant was arrested during an entrapment operation where he was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu. When an arrest is made during an entrapment operation, it is not required that a warrant be secured in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court allowing warrantless arrests.

The contention of frame-up in the case at bar could not be looked upon by the Court with favor in light of straightforward and positive testimony of poseur-buyer identifying him as the seller of shabu. Moreover, the accused-appellant failed to prove that there had been ill-motive on the part of the officers to impute such crimes. Police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.

Court found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) for illegal possession of 0.27 grams of shabu.  For illegal sale of drugs, regardless of quantity, he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) PESOS; 

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Case digest: People vs. Alcuizar

G.R. No 189980

People vs. Alberto Bacus Alcuizar

April 6, 2011

Facts:

Appellant Alcuizar was charged with violation of Sections 5 (illegal sale), 6 (maintaining a drug den), 11 (illegal possession) and 12 (illegal possession of dangerous drug paraphernalia) of Republic Act No. 9165 a buy bust operation and a search on his home by virtue of a warrant led by a SPO1 Agadier.

Present during the search were appellant, appellant’s sister-in-law, one barangay captain, one barangay tanod, and several photographers.

In the RTC, appellant was acquitted in all charges except for his violation of Section 11 or illegal possession of dangerous drug as evidenced by the stic packs of shabu found in his room.

Appellant questions the veracity of the seized item by virtue of the Chain of Custody rule. Appellant cites the failure of the police in marking the evidence immediately after purportedly taking it from him as well as the failure of the police officers to give or leave a copy of the inventory receipt upon the accused or any of his family members.

CA finds the appellant’s contention meritorious.

Ruling:

The gaps in the chain of custody (i.e the transfer of custody, control and custody of the shabu, and the marking of the shabu) affected the identity of the corpus delicti.

To successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

The doubt created by the gaps in the custody, the testimonies and the lack of witnesses to prove that the prohibited drugs were found in appellant’s home constrained the Court to acquit appellant.

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Case Digest: People vs. Noque

G.R. No. 175319

January 15, 2010

People vs. Joselito Noque y Gomez

Facts:

Appellant Joselito Noque Gomez was subject to a buybust operation, from which articles alleged to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) were seized. The seized articles were taken to the police station and submitted to the crime laboratory for examination to determine the chemical composition of the crystalline substance, which positively resulted to be ephedrine, a regulated drug.

Lower Courts prounounced appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the violation of Section Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425 that define and penalize the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs.

Joselito appealed contending that the lower courts erred in convicting him despite the information, alleging methamphetamine hydrochloride as the seized item when the drug actually seized was ephedrine. Joselito contends that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.

Ruling:

The Court affirmed the lower courts decision that the designations and allegations in the information are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs. Ephedrine is a regulated drug, pursuant to Board Resolution No. 2, Series of 1988. Under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. Appellant’s right to be informed of the charges against him has not been violated because where an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly informed not only of such specific crime but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein.

The Court also affirmed the CA’s decision regarding the penalty imposed on appellant in relation to the amount of shabu seized (in this case, 0.060 grams and 2.754 grams. It held that in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances in this case, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, ranging from six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, as maximum.)

As to the violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P500,000.00 was imposed on the appellant for the possession of 339.6075 grams  of prohibited drugs without license or prescription.

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Case Digest: Felipe Ysmael, etc vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, etc

G.R. No. 79538

Felipe Ysmael, etc vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, etc

October 18, 1990

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984 by sending letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Petitioner’s prayers were to no avail. Hence the petition in the Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion to public respondents.

RULING:

The Court stressed the authority of administrative bodies to handle matters within there scope without need of interference by the courts of law. These administrative bodies are deemed to be in better positions to determine issues within their specialty and resolve the same. The Court cited the doctrine of res judicata which avers that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction

The Court also held that the assailed orders by public respondent was in line with the latter’s duty to develop and conserve the country’s natural resources in view of the constitutional mandate of the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. It is their duty to regulate the issuance of licenses (TLA) as they see fit, which the court cannot interfere with. The Court further held that sans grave abuse of discretion which may be imputed to public respondents, the court ruled that petitioner cannot seek affirmative relief.

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Case Digest: Technology Developer, Inc. vs. CA

G.R. No. 94759

Technology Developer, Inc. vs. CA

January 21, 1991

Petitioner Technology Developer, Inc. sought to annul the Mayor’s order in closing the petitioner’s Plant, assailing the latter’s power in denying the former a mayor’s permit on the basis of environment violation.

RULING:

The lower courts were right in upholding the mayor’s order, reasoning that  although the NPCC of the Ministry of human Settlements (now Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources) has the task to determine the existence of pollution and violations of environmental laws, the mayor by virtue of his police power has as much responsibility to protect its constituents from the same and regulate the operation of establishments which pose relative threat to the community.

The Court, in considering the evidence presented, upheld the respondent, stressing the importance of the general welfare of the community over and above the potential economic return of investment but is detrimental to many.

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Case Digest: Pollution Adjudication board vs. Court of Appeal and Solar Textile Finishing Corp.

G.R. 93891

Pollution Adjudication board vs. Court of Appeal and Solar Textile Finishing Corp.

March 11, 1991

Respondent Solar assailed the Ex parte Cease and Desist Order by petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board on the ground that the former was denied due process and that the degree of threat required for the said Order is remiss. Petitioner reasoned that under PD No.984 Section 7(a), the Board has the legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC.

RULING:

The Court ruled in favor of petitioner.

The Court held that the Board may issue the ex parte cease and desist order upon prima facie evidence that the respondent corporation has waste discharge beyond the allowable standards set by the NPCC (Sec5, Effluent Regulations of 1982 and Sec7(a),PD 984).  If it has not yet been subject to the allowable standard, the Board may still issue ex parte cease and desist order upon prima facie evidence that the effluent pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life. The court held that the Board, as the government entity tasked to determine whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions, has the authority to issue the order as it may see fit. This is, after all, allowed by law to address relevant pollution issues as an immediate recourse.

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Case Digest: Paat vs. CA

G.R. No. 111107

Leonardo Paat vs. CA

January 10, 1997

The truck of private respondent was seized and confiscated by the DENR because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Private respondents filed before the courts a suit for replevin (recovery of personal property) despite the pending administrative resolution. Private respondents contended that the DENR had no legal authority to seize the items and that said authority lies on the court as provided for in Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277.

RULING:

The Court held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Private respondents could not say they were deprived of due process, knowing that an administrative proceeding is pending before the DENR, who was yet to render a resolution on the controversy.

The Court also ruled that private respondents miserably failed to prove the wrongful detention of the subject truck confiscated. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended by E.O 277.  Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.

The Court clarifies that with the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

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Case Digest: Mustang Lumber vs. CA

G.R. No. 104988

Mustang Lumber vs. CA

June 18, 1996

Petitioner lumber corporation assailed the nature of the seizure of its lumber products by respondents.

 

RULING:

The court held that the term ‘lumber’ as used in the information against petitioners, although not mentioned in express terms as among the prohibited articles under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705(Revised Forestry Code) must be understood in its ordinary and common usage. Lumber is to be understood as a processed log or timber. The court said that since the law makes no distinction between raw or processed timber, neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus. The court held that the petitioners were then correctly charged with the offense of violating Sec68 of PD No 705 as alleged by the facts in the information.

The court also held that the seizure of items and the truck carrying the same was done lawfully as it falls under lawful warrantless searches. Search of moving vehicles is one of the exceptions to the general rule that searches must be done with a warrant. Furthermore, such search and seizure was a valid exercise of the power vested upon the forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775.

Finally, the court stressed petitioner’s violation of Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. The court held that Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative indeed had the authority to seize the Lumber since petitioner’s license, at the time of seizure, was still suspended. Thus, petitioner was in illegal possession of the seized articles.

The Court ruled against petitioner in all three consolidated cases.

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Case Digest: Minors of the Philippines vs. DENR

G.R. No 101083

Minors of the Philippines vs. DENR

July 30, 1993

Petitioner minors, represented by their parents, contended that the granting of the TLAs (Timber License Agreement) by respondent DENR was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. RTC dismissed the class suit on the ff grounds: 1)lack of cause of action; 2)the issue involved a  political question and 3)the relief sought would violate the non-impairment of contracts clause.

RULING:

The Court ruled in favor of petitioners.

The Court held that petitioners had the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of the suit. The Court recognized the beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, citing provisions in the Constitution of the rights of the people specifically that of Sec 16, Art 2, which is the specific legal right invoked by the petitioners. The Court also stressed the correlative duty of the DENR as the branch of government tasked with the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources (E.O. No. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987). Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.

As to the issue on political question, the Court held that the case should be afforded judicial review, citing second paragraph of sec1, Article VIII of the Constitution which states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The Court may take cognizance of cases involving issues on ‘grave abuse of discretion’.

The Court also assailed the ruling of the lower court, invoking the non-impariment clause, reasoning , for one, that the respondents did not even raise the said issue. Granting for argment’s sake that respondents did, the TLA is not a contract but is only a license or a privilege which may be subject to withdrawal by proper authority if deemed necessary for the general welfare and betterment of the country.

The Court granted the petition, allowing petitioners to amend complaint against TLA holders.

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Case Digest: Mead vs. Argel

G.R. No. L-41958

Donald Mead  vs. Hon. Manuel Argel, CFI

July 20, 1982

Petitioner Donald Mead assailed the legal personality of the Provincial Fiscal to file an information against him for his alleged violation of RA No. 3931 or An Act Creating a National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission. Petitioner averred that the National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission created under the said law has the authority to hear cases involving violations under the same.

The Court ruled that the filing by the Provincial Fiscal of the case was premature sans the findings of the Commission on the matter.

Petitioner was being sued for the offense of allegedly causing pollution of a waterway (highway canal)(Sec 9). The Court held that the exclusive authority to determine whether or not ‘pollution’ did exist is vested in the Commission, who is in better position to determine the same for such requires specialized knowledge of technical and scientific matters which are not ordinarily within the competence of Fiscals or of those sitting in a court of justice (Sec 8).

RULING:

Unless the case involves that of nuisance under the Civil Code or until there is a ruling by the Commission on the alleged act of pollution, no court action shall be initiated (Sec8).

Without a prior determination or finding by the Commission that the provisions of the subject law had been violated, the provincial Fiscal lacked the authority to file the case against petitioner.

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Case Digest: Salenillas vs. CA

G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989

ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS vs.Court of Appeals

FACTS:

The petitioner Elena Salenillas acquired properties after purchasing them from her parents, the Enciso spouses.  The petitioners mortgaged  the property twice, the latest done on December4, 1975 in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of P2,500.00. Petitioners failed to pay and so the property was extrajudicially foreclosed and was then sold in the public auction on February 27, 1981. A “Sheriff’s Final Deed” was issued on July 12, 1983.

RTC of Camarines Norte issued motions for writ of possession, which the petitioners opposed.

Petitioners sought for reconsideration, which was later on denied. The Court of appeals made a similar decision.

On November 17, 1983 and on on August 31, 1984,Petitioners wished to repurchase the property and maintained that  they had the right to do so as provided for under Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, which states that,

Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.

The Respondent state argued that the Petitioners were disqualified from being legal heirs of the subject property since petitioners acquired the said property through inheritance but by sale.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners had the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act.

HELD:

Petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

Invoking the provision made under Section 119 of the Public Land Act, the petitioners, being legal heirs, had the right to repurchase the said property as long as the 5-year period had not yet proscribed. The Court held that when the petitioners expressed their desire to repurchase the property in 1984, it was evident that the 5-year period had not yet proscribed, the public auction having been in 1981 and the issuance of the Final deed in 1983.

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Case Digest: Parayno vs. Jovellanos

G.R No. 148408

July 14, 2006

Concepcion Parayno vs. Jose Jovellanos

FACTS:

                Respondent Parayno was an owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advice, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner's gasoline station. Resolution 50 stipulated the alleged violations of the gasoline station in question. Petitioner sought for reconsideration, which was then denied. She then filed a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus in the RTC, contending that her gasoline station was not covered by Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, which prohibits gasoline service stations which are within 100meters away from  any public or private school, public library, playground, church, and hospital based on the straight line method measured from the nearest side of the building nearest the lot if there are no intervening buildings to the nearest pump of the gasoline station. Petitioner contended that hers was not a "gasoline service station" but a "gasoline filling station" governed by Section 21 thereof. Moreover, the decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in a previous case filed by the same respondent Jovellanos against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno) should bar the grounds invoked by respondent municipality in Resolution No. 50.  The RTC ruled against petitioner by applying the virtue of ejusdem generis, saying that a “gasoline filling station” fell within the ambit of Section 44. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was, again, only denied by the RTC. The same fate was met by the petition in the CA. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s gasoline filling station could be likened to that of a gasoline service station as provided for in Section 44 of the Official zoning Code by virtue of Ejusdem Generis.

HELD:

The Court held that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear distinction between a gasoline service station and a gasoline filling station as found in Section 21 and Section 42 of the said ordinance. It was made clear that the two terms were intended to be distinguished from the other, which the respondent further admitted. Respondent municipality cannot invoke the principle of Ejusdem generis which means "of the same kind, class or nature” but rather should apply the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius which means that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others.

With the distinction clearly provided, respondents could not insist that "gasoline service station" under Section 44 necessarily included "gasoline filling station" under Section 21.

The Court also held that the HLURB decision in the previous case filed against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno) by respondent Jovellanos had effectively barred the issues in Resolution No. 50 based on the principle of res judicata or the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit. With the similarity of the identity of interest of the case at bar and that of the previous case already decided by HLURB, the litigation should already end  since the concerns had already been resolved. The Court stated that an individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause.

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