Case Digest: People vs. Del Monte

G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008

People vs. NORBERTO DEL MONTE Y GAPAY alias “OBET”

Facts:

Accused-appellant questioned his conviction, contending that the evidence against him should have been rendered inadmissible for failure to comply with Section 21 of RA 9165.

Ruling:

Accused-appellants claim that police failed to take pictures of him with the evidence and that the police, who had initial custody, failed to conduct physical inventory was raised only during appeal.

The court held that it is already late for accused-appellant to do this.

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds.  However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him.  Indeed, the police officers' alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal.  In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value.  Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection.  Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. 

The Court also added that, non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence.  

Afterall, all the elements necessary to prosecute sale of illegal drugs had been established. The prosecution clearly showed that the sale of the drugs actually happened and that the shabu subject of the sale was brought and identified in court. 

The court sustained accused-appellant’s conviction.

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Case Digest: People vs. Rivera

G.R. No. 182347

People vs. Emilio Rivera Y CABLANG ALIAS `BOY,'

October 17, 2008

Facts:

Accused-appelant questioned his conviction on the ground that prosecution only relied on the testimony of one witness and that there had been a gap in the seizure and custody of the alleged evidence for failure of the operatives to take inventory of the same.

Ruling:

This Court takes pride in upholding a most fundamental constitutional right which is the right of an accused in criminal prosecutions to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in order to justify the conviction of an accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome this constitutional presumption of innocence.

The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons such as the other police officers forming a buy-bust team is not a crucial point against the prosecution since the matter of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is not for the court to decide. It is the prosecution which has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.  Moreover, the testimony of a single prosecution witness, if credible and positive and satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is enough to sustain a conviction.

Truth is established not by the quantity of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. The testimony only needs to establish sufficiently: (1) the identity of the buyer, seller, object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof.

The categorical and convincing testimonies of the policemen, backed up by physical evidence, overcome the unsubstantiated claim of ill-motive by appellant. Accused-appellant's guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence in his favor is overturned.

The Court sustained the conviction of accused-appellant.

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Case Digest: Go-Tan vs. Tan

Sharica Mari Go-Tan vs. Spouses Perfecto and Juanita Tan

G.R. No. 168852

September 30, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner Sharica filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against her husband,Steven, and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."

Respondents contend that they cannot be included in the charge since they are not among the personalities liable as enumerated under the said law by virtue of “expresio unius est exclusion alterius.”

Ruling:

The Court ruled in favor of petitioner with regard to the inclusion of the respondent spouses.

A provision of the said law expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC (Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262), which allowed legal principles developed in the RPC may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. 9262.

Citing jurisprudence, the court held that the “principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators”.

Furthermore, Section 5 of R.A. 9262 recognizes the acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another

The maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application in the case at bar since it is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction” and not of universal application nor is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent when not plainly indicated.

However, proving conspiracy is a matter of evidence and can be best decided after fullblown trial on the merits.

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Case Digest: People vs. Agulay

G.R. No. 181747

People vs. Narciso Lopez Agulay

September 26, 2008

Facts:

Lower Courts found accused appellant guilty of illegal sale and illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Accused-appellants questioned the means and method the police undertook the operation and the credibility of the prosecution witness.

Ruling:

The dissent maintains that the chain of custody rule "would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence x x x." This means that all persons who came into contact with the seized drugs should testify in court; otherwise, the unbroken chain of custody would not be established.

The Court disagree. Not all people who came into contact with the seized drugs are required to testify in court. 

The integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. The accused-appellant in this case bears the burden to make some showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and a presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties.

After a thorough review of the records of the case, the court found that the chain of custody of the seized substance was not broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized in this case. The non-presentation of witnesses of other persons such as the evidence custodian and the officer on duty was not a crucial point against the prosecution.  Unless there was proof to the contrary, the entries in the documents are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated and they need not testify thereon.

The Court found accused appellant guilty of the illegal sale of drugs but not of the possession of dangerous drugs on account of the second and third sachets alleged to have been retrieved from him after the sale of the first since it could not be done so without being properly charged therewith.

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Case Digest: People vs Dela Cruz; People vs. Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 181545

People vs. Mark Dela Cruz

October 08, 2008

Facts:

Appellant Mark Dela Cruz was found guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 after he allegedly sold prohibited drugs to the poseur-buyer. The prohibited drugs were handed to appellant by companions identified to be an alias Amay and an alias Tabo. Appellant denied the charge and said that he was arrested after refusing to give information about Amay, whom the police were after. His testimony was corroborated by other witnesses.

Lower court gave weight to the testimony by the poseur-buyer and upheld the presumption of regularity in the operation conducted by the officers.

Appellant appealed, questioning the identity of the shabu allegedly confiscated from him in view of Section 21 (1) of RA No. 9165 (inventory of seized drugs) and Section 21 (3) of the same law(certification of the forensic laboratory examination results).

Ruling:

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.

Citing jurisprudence, the failure of the police to comply with the procedure in the custody of the seized drugs raised doubt as to its origins.

The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. TheCourt believed that the prosecution failed to clearly establish the chain of custody of the seized plastic sachets, containing shabu from the time they were first allegedly received until they were brought to the police investigator. There were no records to show that the procedural requirements in Section 21 were complied with.

The presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the constitutional right of presumption of evidence in view of the circumstances. “The presumption of regularity is merely just that--a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.”

The appellant was acquitted.

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Case Digest: People vs. Dela Cruz; People vs. Carlos Dela Cruz

G.R. No 182348

People vs. Carlos Dela Cruz

November 20, 2008

Facts:

Accused- appellant Carlos Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11(2) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Accused-appellant was arrested together with a certain Boy Bicol, who was subject to a warrant of arrest. The two were talking in a nipa hut hideout when the warrant of arrest against Boy Bicol was served. Having been on the scene, accused-appellant was also arrested. On the scene were shabu and firearms, found atop the table and in drawers.

Accused-appellant denied that the guns and drugs were in his possession. Accused-appellant was acquitted for illegal possession of firearms but was convicted for illegal possession of prohibited drugs.

Accused appellant  appealed, claiming that the presence of all the elements of the offense of possession of dangerous drug was not proved beyond reasonable doubt since both actual and constructive possessions were not proved. 

Ruling:

The Court reversed the lower court’s decision and acquitted the accused-appellant

In all these cases, the accused was held to be in constructive possession of illegal drugs since they were shown to enjoy dominion and control over the premises where these drugs were found.

Citing jurisprudence, accused-appellant couldn’t have been in constructive possession of the items since he is not he owner of the nipa hut subject to the warrant nor did he exercise dominion or control over the said hut.

Since accused-appellant was not in possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicol's nipa hut, his subsequent arrest was also invalid by virtue of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest (Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.)

His arrest, independent of the buy-bust operation targeting Boy Bicol, was therefore not lawful as he was not proved to be committing any offense.

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Case Digest: People vs.Ted Miguel Batoon and Melchor Miguel Batoon

G.R. No 184599

People vs.Ted Miguel Batoon and Melchor Miguel Batoon

November 24, 2010

Facts:

Accused-appellants Teddy Batoon and Melchor Batoon were found guilty of violating Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 after they sold a sachet to a poseur-buyer in a buy-operation and after 3 more sachets were found in their possession.

Teddy and Melchor appealed the decision, questioning the chain of custody over the alleged confiscated prohibited drugs and Melchor’s conviction for illegal possession of shabu. 

Ruling:

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.

The Court held that the buy-bust operation was valid and that there had been no showing in the records that the chain of custody was broken.

For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following elements must be established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Although the three sachets containing shabu were found solely in the possession of Teddy, it was evident that Melchor had knowledge of its existence. Records regarding the transaction between the poseur-buyer, Teddy and melchor showed that the accused-appellants conspired in the illegal-business of drugs.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt against accused-appellants were held to have been successfully adduced. 

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Case Digest: People vs. Macabare

G.R. No. 179941

People vs. Lito Lopez Macabare

August 24, 2009

Facts:

Accused appellant Lito Macabare, a detention prisoner, was found guilty of violation of  Section 16 of RA 6425, as amended, after a 410.6 grams of white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu was found in his Cell (in which he was the sole occupant) during a surprise check by the police.

Macabare denied ownership of the item found in his cell. He further claimed that the ‘coleman’ where the shabu was found in could have been owned by somebody else since there had been various inmates who also sleep in his cell. Macabare contended that he shouldn’t be convicted based on mere circumstancial evidence.

Lower courts found him guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and a fine of 5million which was reduced to 500,000.

Ruling:

                Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision.

To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person.

The circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to conclude that Macabare indeed owned the contraband. Moreover, the prosecution was able to show Macabare’s liability under the concepts of disputable presumption of ownership(The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence) and constructive possession(when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found).

The Court also held that although it is true that the presumption of innocence assumes primacy over the presumption of regularity, it cannot be applied in the case at bar since the circumstantial evidence imputing animus posidendi to Macabare over the prohibited substance found in his kubol coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions constitutes proof of guilt of Macabare beyond a reasonable doubt

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Case Digest: People vs. Sembrano

G.R. No. 185848

People Vs. Michael Castro Sembrano

August 16, 2010

Facts:

In a buy-bust operation and after a follow up search, Accused Appellant was arrested and charged with the violation of Section 5 (illegal sale) and Section 11, Article II (illegal possession) of R.A. 9165. He was then found guilty by the lower courts.

Accused-appellant appealed the lower court’s ruling, contending that the arrest made on him was illegal and thus the alleged evidence seized during such warrantless arrest shouldn’t have been admitted (‘fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine”). He further averred that he had been framed by the police officers.

Ruling:

The court held that the arrest made was legal. Appellant was arrested during an entrapment operation where he was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu. When an arrest is made during an entrapment operation, it is not required that a warrant be secured in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court allowing warrantless arrests.

The contention of frame-up in the case at bar could not be looked upon by the Court with favor in light of straightforward and positive testimony of poseur-buyer identifying him as the seller of shabu. Moreover, the accused-appellant failed to prove that there had been ill-motive on the part of the officers to impute such crimes. Police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.

Court found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) for illegal possession of 0.27 grams of shabu.  For illegal sale of drugs, regardless of quantity, he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) PESOS; 

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Case digest: People vs. Alcuizar

G.R. No 189980

People vs. Alberto Bacus Alcuizar

April 6, 2011

Facts:

Appellant Alcuizar was charged with violation of Sections 5 (illegal sale), 6 (maintaining a drug den), 11 (illegal possession) and 12 (illegal possession of dangerous drug paraphernalia) of Republic Act No. 9165 a buy bust operation and a search on his home by virtue of a warrant led by a SPO1 Agadier.

Present during the search were appellant, appellant’s sister-in-law, one barangay captain, one barangay tanod, and several photographers.

In the RTC, appellant was acquitted in all charges except for his violation of Section 11 or illegal possession of dangerous drug as evidenced by the stic packs of shabu found in his room.

Appellant questions the veracity of the seized item by virtue of the Chain of Custody rule. Appellant cites the failure of the police in marking the evidence immediately after purportedly taking it from him as well as the failure of the police officers to give or leave a copy of the inventory receipt upon the accused or any of his family members.

CA finds the appellant’s contention meritorious.

Ruling:

The gaps in the chain of custody (i.e the transfer of custody, control and custody of the shabu, and the marking of the shabu) affected the identity of the corpus delicti.

To successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

The doubt created by the gaps in the custody, the testimonies and the lack of witnesses to prove that the prohibited drugs were found in appellant’s home constrained the Court to acquit appellant.

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Case Digest: People vs. Noque

G.R. No. 175319

January 15, 2010

People vs. Joselito Noque y Gomez

Facts:

Appellant Joselito Noque Gomez was subject to a buybust operation, from which articles alleged to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) were seized. The seized articles were taken to the police station and submitted to the crime laboratory for examination to determine the chemical composition of the crystalline substance, which positively resulted to be ephedrine, a regulated drug.

Lower Courts prounounced appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the violation of Section Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425 that define and penalize the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs.

Joselito appealed contending that the lower courts erred in convicting him despite the information, alleging methamphetamine hydrochloride as the seized item when the drug actually seized was ephedrine. Joselito contends that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.

Ruling:

The Court affirmed the lower courts decision that the designations and allegations in the information are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs. Ephedrine is a regulated drug, pursuant to Board Resolution No. 2, Series of 1988. Under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. Appellant’s right to be informed of the charges against him has not been violated because where an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly informed not only of such specific crime but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein.

The Court also affirmed the CA’s decision regarding the penalty imposed on appellant in relation to the amount of shabu seized (in this case, 0.060 grams and 2.754 grams. It held that in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances in this case, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, ranging from six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, as maximum.)

As to the violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P500,000.00 was imposed on the appellant for the possession of 339.6075 grams  of prohibited drugs without license or prescription.

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Case Digest: People vs. Taraya

G.R. No. 135551. October 27, 2000

People vs. Taraya

FACTS:

Accused-appelants Ampie Taraya, Jonar Estrada and Arly Cantuba, all are relatives, were charged for the crime of murder qualified by treachery for the death of Salvador Reyes.

Salvador Reyes was killed on the night of September 24, 1995. Prosecution witnesses  Mariano Adillo, David Angeles and Gregorio Reyes testified against the accused appellants. Their statements were countered by  Armando Bilara, Domingo Decena, SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez and the accused appellants themselves.

Prosecution witness Mariano testified that he saw the three accused approach Salvador the night Salvador was killed. Prosecution witness David Angles swore to have seen the actual killing and positively identified the three accused. Gregorio Reyes, the victim’s father, said that his son had an altercation with Arly.

The defense countered their claims. Barangay Tanod Armando Bilara stated that David Angeles’ brother had a fistfight with Jonar, implying that there might be a different reason as to David Angeles’ insistence on Jonar’s involvement in the killing. Domingo Decena also testified that on the night of the killing he saw Salvador hit Ampie with a pipe which Ampie luckily avoided. Domingo added that Ampie, to defend himself hacked Salvador and ran away. Domingo stated that he also ran back home out of fear and only found out of Salvador’s death the next morning. SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez testified that Ampie did surrender himself at the police station on Octiber 9, 1997. Ampie admitted on killing Salvador but contended that he did so out of self-defense and said that his cousins had nothing to do with it. Jonar and Arly both had alibis.

Trial Court ruled against accused appellants for murder and appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Accused appellants appealed, arguing that  Ampie should not be charged with murder since he have done so only out of self-defense plus Salvador was also armed with a pipe that night, which disqualifies treachery in the case. They further asserted that Arly and Jonar were not co-conspirators in the killing of Salvador Reyes. They were implicated by David Angeles, Jr claims which were not supported by clear evidence. Furthermore, they insisted that Ampie be allowed to avail of a mitigated sentence since he surrendered himself at the police station at his own will.

ISSUE:

1.     Whether or not Jonar and Arly were co-conspirators in the killing of Salvador.

2.     Whether or not Ampie’s contention of self-defense be given consideration.

3.     Whether or not Ampie’s voluntary surrender made him eligible for a a mitigated sentence.

HELD:

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It does not require that such agreement occurred for an appreciable period prior to the commission of the crime; it is sufficient that at the time of the execution thereof, all accused had the same purpose and were united therein.

The Court ruled that David Angeles’ testimony was not persuasive as to the participation of Arly and jonar in the crime. There had been no certainty as to their action to show a deliberate and concerted cooperation on their part as to likewise render them liable for the killing of Salvador. Prosecution evidence failed to convince the court as to its sufficiency with moral certainty that there indeed had been conspiracy among accused-appellants. Thus, The Court acquitted Jonar and Arly.

The Court also ruled that, there being no positive and direct evidence to show that the attack was sudden and unexpected, treachery as a circumstance to qualify the killing to murder cannot be appreciated against AMPIE. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Treachery as a qualifying circumstance requires that the offender deliberately employs means of execution which deprives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate. Ampie thereforecould only be charged with homicide.

As to the issue of Ampie’s voluntary surrender, the court emphasized that for one to avail of mitigating circumstance for  voluntary surrender, the following requisites must be present: (1) the offender had not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; (3) the surrender was voluntary; and (4) there is no pending warrant of arrest or information filed.

When Ampie surrendered, a pending warrant of arrest had already been issued. His arrest by that time was already imminent.

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CASE DIGEST: Stephen Tibagong vs. People of the Philippines

Stephen Tibagong vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No 182178

August 15, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 or RA 9165.

Facts state that arresting officers, PO3 Faelogo and PO3 Paquera, received information from a caller, informing them of an illegal drug trade. The two proceeded to the reported place where they found petitioner, flicking a plastic allegedly containing shabu. The police officers arrested petitioner and seized the said plastic as well as the lighter found in the petitioner’s possession.

Petitioner denied ownership. He further claimed that he wasn’t doing anything illegal and so the arrest done was a violation of his rights and that the article seized should be inadmissible since it is the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was right in averring that the evidence was inadmissible, it being the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’.

HELD:

The court held that the petitioner’s failure to raise the issue on the validity of his arrest before arraignment and his active participation in the proceedings in the lower court estopped him from assailing the same on appeal. He was deemed to have waived his right.

The admissibility of the articles as evidence relied on whether the search made was lawful.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions permitting a warrantless arrest: (a)     When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)     When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c)     When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The following occasions also permits a warrantless search: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"

3. Search of a moving vehicle;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

The Court held that sufficient evidence supported  the warrantless arrest of petitioner effected under Section 5 (a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto.

The police officers witnessed petitioner flicking a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance in plain view. Arousing their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu, the arresting officers immediately approached petitioner, introduced themselves as police officers and effected the arrest.  After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

The arrest having been lawful, the item seized was likewise lawful. Not to mention, the item’s veracity was well established.

The Court affirmed the lower courts decision and found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

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Case Digest: Alih vs. Castro

Alih vs. Castro

151 SCRA 279

 June 23, 1987

Facts:

Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives.  A shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger –printing, paraffin testing  and photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights

The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem  due to the assassination of the city mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence against them.

Held:

The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did not excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be protected from the  arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant and so the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 “The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”

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Case Digest: People vs. Astorga

G.R. No. 110097; December 22, 1997

FACTS:

 Appellant Arnulfo Astorga appealed the court’s decision on Criminal Case No. 8243 wherein appellant was charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code or the kidnap and detention of a minor.

Astorga insisted that the inconsistencies and the contradictions of the prosecution’s witnesses should be deemed incredible and that the delay in the filing of the accusation weakened the case. Furthermore, Astorga claimed that he had no motive to kidnap the 8-year-old Yvonne Traya which should’ve been apparent and proven upon conviction. Ultimately, Astorga claimed that the court erred in convicting him despite the fact that he had not detained nor locked Yvonne up which is an important element in kidnapping.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the prosecution’s witnesses were credible.

2.) Whether or not the lack of motive by the appellant is significant in the court’s decision.

3.) Whether or not it was kidnapping or coercion.

RULING:

1.)    The delay in the making of the criminal accusation does not necessarily weaken the credibility of the witnesses especially if it had been satisfactorily explained. In the case, one week was reasonable since the victim was a resident in Binaungan and that the case was filed in Tagum, Davao.

2.)    The court found it irrelevant to identify the motive since motive is not an element of the crime. Motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Besides, the appellant himself admitted having taken Yvonne to Maco Central Elementary School.

3.)    The court agreed with the appellant’s contention. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellant’s forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no “lock up”. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Rather, the felony committed was grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code.

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Case Digest: PEOPLE VS. BRACAMONTE

G.R. No. 95939; June 17, 1996

FACTS:

 On October 6, 1987, appellant Florentino Bracamonte, together with Manuel Sapon and Ernie Cabral, stood charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide after they were positively identified by Violeta Parnala, the owner of the house and the mother of one of the victims.

Parnala and her husband arrived home from the Kingdom of Jehovah’s Witnesses and were confounded when their housemaid refused to heed their call from the outside. Parnala was surprised to see three men emerge from inside the house.  The three men then dashed off.

Found inside the house were the bodies of 6-year old Jay Vee and the Paranala’s housemaid, Rosalina. Some items, amounting to P1,100, were also found to have been missing. Thus, the charges.

 Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in 1989 while Sapon and Bracamonte were at large until the latter’s arrest in October of the same year. Appellant Bracamonte denied the charges and interposed the defense of alibi. Appellant also contended that there was no circumstantial evidence that will link him in the crime and that Parnala couldn’t possible know him to merit identification.

 ISSUE:

Whether or not Bracamonte’s defense of alibi and Parnala’s lack of personal affiliation with Bracamonte are worth discharging the appellant of the crime.

 RULING:

 It has been said that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since it is very easy to concoct.  In order that this defense may prosper, it must be established clearly and convincingly not only that the accused is elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime, but that likewise it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the vicinity thereof. In the instant case, appellant Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and convincing proof, that it was physically impossible for him to be at the victims’ house at the time the crime was committed.

Positive identification by an independent witness who has not been shown to have any reason or motive to testify falsely must prevail over simple denials and the unacceptable alibi of the accused. Appellant himself admitted that he was not aware of any reason or motive why Parnala should testify against him. There is also nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires that in order for there to be a positive identification by a prosecution witness of a felon, he must know the latter personally. If this were the case, the prosecution would rarely get any conviction since, in most instances, the perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to the victim. The witness’ degree of closeness or familiarity with the accused, although may be helpful, is by no means an indispensable requirement for purposes of positive identification.

The Court noted that appellant, together with his two (2) other co-accused, were charged and convicted of robbery with double homicide. The charge and the corresponding conviction should have been for robbery with homicide only although two persons were killed. In this complex crime, the penalty prescribed in Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the number of killings accompanying the robbery. The multiplicity of the victims slain, though, is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.

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