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Showing posts with label 2002. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2002. Show all posts
Wednesday, June 21, 2017
Case Digest: Kho vs. CA
Kho vs CA
FACTS:
In the case at bar, the petitioner applied for
the issuance of a preliminary injunctive order on the ground that she is
entitled to the use of the trademark on Chin Chun Su and its container based on
her copyright and patent over the same. The respondents, on the other hand,
alleged as their defense that Summerville is the exclusive and authorized
importer, re-packer and distributor of Chin Chun Su products manufactured by
Shun Yi Factory of Taiwan; that the said Taiwanese manufacturing company
authorized Summerville to register its trade name Chin Chun Su Medicated Cream
with the Philippine Patent Office and other appropriate governmental agencies
Issue: WON Petitioner has the right to support her claim for the exclusive use
of the subject trade name and its container.
HELD:
Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual
property rights that cannot be interchanged with one another. A trademark is
any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services
(service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container
of goods. In
relation thereto, a trade name means the name or designation identifying or
distinguishing an enterprise. Meanwhile,
the scope of a copyright is confined to literary and artistic works which are
original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain protected
from the moment of their creation. Patentable inventions, on the other
hand, refer to any technical solution of a problem in any field of human
activity which is new, involves an inventive step and is industrially
applicable.
Petitioner has no right to support her claim for the exclusive
use of the subject trade name and its container. The name and container of a
beauty cream product are proper subjects of a trademark inasmuch as the same
falls squarely within its definition. In order to be entitled to exclusively
use the same in the sale of the beauty cream product, the user must
sufficiently prove that she registered or used it before anybody else did. The
petitioner’s copyright and patent registration of the name and container would
not guarantee her the right to the exclusive use of the same for the reason
that they are not appropriate subjects of the said intellectual rights.
Consequently, a preliminary injunction order cannot be issued for the reason
that the petitioner has not proven that she has a clear right over the said
name and container to the exclusion of others, not having proven that she has
registered a trademark thereto or used the same before anyone did.
Monday, July 4, 2016
Case Digest: Codilla vs. de Venecia
G.R. No. 150605 December 10, 2002
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively,
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively,
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN
Facts:
Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid.
2. Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.
3. Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.
HELD:
1. The respondent’s proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not represent the electorate’s choice.
2. Since the validity of respondent’s proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending finality. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondent’s eligibility was not the issue.
3. The facts had been settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter, that petitioner won. The rule of law demands that its (Comelec’s) Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. Such duty is ministerial. Petitioner had the right to the office which merits recognition regardless of personal judgment or opinion.
Monday, March 21, 2016
Case Digest: Ampatuan, et al. vs. COMELEC
Ampatuan, et al. vs. COMELEC
G. R. No. 149803. January 31, 2002
FACTS:
The COMELEC lifted its order suspending the proclamation and thereafter proclaimed petitioners as the victors in the May 14, 2001 Maguindanao Provincial election. Respondents petitioned before the Supreme Court the suspension of the effects of the said proclamation and insisted that there had been a “failure of election”. The COMELEC ordered the consolidation of respondents’ petitions and a random technical examination on several precincts.
Petitioners contended that by virtue of their proclamation, the proper remedy available to respondents was not a petition for declaration of failure of elections but an election protest.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC had jurisdiction to act on respondents’ petitions even after proclamation of petitioners as winners
Ruling:
The Comelec en banc has the authority to annul election results and/or declare a failure of elections.
The Court held that respondents’ allegations of massive fraud and terrorism, which led to a failure to elect, fell squarely within Sec 6. Of the Omnibus Election Code (Failure of Election). “The Comelec is duty-bound to conduct an investigation as to the veracity of respondents’ allegations of massive fraud and terrorism that attended the conduct of the May 14, 2001 election”. There can be no assumption that petitioners’ proclamation and assumption into office on June 30, 2001, was legal precisely because the conduct by which the elections were held was put in issue by respondents.
The Court, in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, directed COMELEC to proceed with the hearing of the consolidated petitions and the technical examination with deliberate dispatch.












