Case Digest: Mustang Lumber vs. CA

G.R. No. 104988

Mustang Lumber vs. CA

June 18, 1996

Petitioner lumber corporation assailed the nature of the seizure of its lumber products by respondents.

 

RULING:

The court held that the term ‘lumber’ as used in the information against petitioners, although not mentioned in express terms as among the prohibited articles under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705(Revised Forestry Code) must be understood in its ordinary and common usage. Lumber is to be understood as a processed log or timber. The court said that since the law makes no distinction between raw or processed timber, neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus. The court held that the petitioners were then correctly charged with the offense of violating Sec68 of PD No 705 as alleged by the facts in the information.

The court also held that the seizure of items and the truck carrying the same was done lawfully as it falls under lawful warrantless searches. Search of moving vehicles is one of the exceptions to the general rule that searches must be done with a warrant. Furthermore, such search and seizure was a valid exercise of the power vested upon the forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775.

Finally, the court stressed petitioner’s violation of Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. The court held that Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative indeed had the authority to seize the Lumber since petitioner’s license, at the time of seizure, was still suspended. Thus, petitioner was in illegal possession of the seized articles.

The Court ruled against petitioner in all three consolidated cases.

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Case Digest: PEOPLE VS. BRACAMONTE

G.R. No. 95939; June 17, 1996

FACTS:

 On October 6, 1987, appellant Florentino Bracamonte, together with Manuel Sapon and Ernie Cabral, stood charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide after they were positively identified by Violeta Parnala, the owner of the house and the mother of one of the victims.

Parnala and her husband arrived home from the Kingdom of Jehovah’s Witnesses and were confounded when their housemaid refused to heed their call from the outside. Parnala was surprised to see three men emerge from inside the house.  The three men then dashed off.

Found inside the house were the bodies of 6-year old Jay Vee and the Paranala’s housemaid, Rosalina. Some items, amounting to P1,100, were also found to have been missing. Thus, the charges.

 Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in 1989 while Sapon and Bracamonte were at large until the latter’s arrest in October of the same year. Appellant Bracamonte denied the charges and interposed the defense of alibi. Appellant also contended that there was no circumstantial evidence that will link him in the crime and that Parnala couldn’t possible know him to merit identification.

 ISSUE:

Whether or not Bracamonte’s defense of alibi and Parnala’s lack of personal affiliation with Bracamonte are worth discharging the appellant of the crime.

 RULING:

 It has been said that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since it is very easy to concoct.  In order that this defense may prosper, it must be established clearly and convincingly not only that the accused is elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime, but that likewise it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the vicinity thereof. In the instant case, appellant Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and convincing proof, that it was physically impossible for him to be at the victims’ house at the time the crime was committed.

Positive identification by an independent witness who has not been shown to have any reason or motive to testify falsely must prevail over simple denials and the unacceptable alibi of the accused. Appellant himself admitted that he was not aware of any reason or motive why Parnala should testify against him. There is also nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires that in order for there to be a positive identification by a prosecution witness of a felon, he must know the latter personally. If this were the case, the prosecution would rarely get any conviction since, in most instances, the perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to the victim. The witness’ degree of closeness or familiarity with the accused, although may be helpful, is by no means an indispensable requirement for purposes of positive identification.

The Court noted that appellant, together with his two (2) other co-accused, were charged and convicted of robbery with double homicide. The charge and the corresponding conviction should have been for robbery with homicide only although two persons were killed. In this complex crime, the penalty prescribed in Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the number of killings accompanying the robbery. The multiplicity of the victims slain, though, is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.

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