Case Digest: Salenillas vs. CA

G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989

ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS vs.Court of Appeals

FACTS:

The petitioner Elena Salenillas acquired properties after purchasing them from her parents, the Enciso spouses.  The petitioners mortgaged  the property twice, the latest done on December4, 1975 in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of P2,500.00. Petitioners failed to pay and so the property was extrajudicially foreclosed and was then sold in the public auction on February 27, 1981. A “Sheriff’s Final Deed” was issued on July 12, 1983.

RTC of Camarines Norte issued motions for writ of possession, which the petitioners opposed.

Petitioners sought for reconsideration, which was later on denied. The Court of appeals made a similar decision.

On November 17, 1983 and on on August 31, 1984,Petitioners wished to repurchase the property and maintained that  they had the right to do so as provided for under Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, which states that,

Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.

The Respondent state argued that the Petitioners were disqualified from being legal heirs of the subject property since petitioners acquired the said property through inheritance but by sale.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners had the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act.

HELD:

Petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

Invoking the provision made under Section 119 of the Public Land Act, the petitioners, being legal heirs, had the right to repurchase the said property as long as the 5-year period had not yet proscribed. The Court held that when the petitioners expressed their desire to repurchase the property in 1984, it was evident that the 5-year period had not yet proscribed, the public auction having been in 1981 and the issuance of the Final deed in 1983.

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Case Digest: Parayno vs. Jovellanos

G.R No. 148408

July 14, 2006

Concepcion Parayno vs. Jose Jovellanos

FACTS:

                Respondent Parayno was an owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advice, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner's gasoline station. Resolution 50 stipulated the alleged violations of the gasoline station in question. Petitioner sought for reconsideration, which was then denied. She then filed a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus in the RTC, contending that her gasoline station was not covered by Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, which prohibits gasoline service stations which are within 100meters away from  any public or private school, public library, playground, church, and hospital based on the straight line method measured from the nearest side of the building nearest the lot if there are no intervening buildings to the nearest pump of the gasoline station. Petitioner contended that hers was not a "gasoline service station" but a "gasoline filling station" governed by Section 21 thereof. Moreover, the decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in a previous case filed by the same respondent Jovellanos against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno) should bar the grounds invoked by respondent municipality in Resolution No. 50.  The RTC ruled against petitioner by applying the virtue of ejusdem generis, saying that a “gasoline filling station” fell within the ambit of Section 44. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was, again, only denied by the RTC. The same fate was met by the petition in the CA. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s gasoline filling station could be likened to that of a gasoline service station as provided for in Section 44 of the Official zoning Code by virtue of Ejusdem Generis.

HELD:

The Court held that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear distinction between a gasoline service station and a gasoline filling station as found in Section 21 and Section 42 of the said ordinance. It was made clear that the two terms were intended to be distinguished from the other, which the respondent further admitted. Respondent municipality cannot invoke the principle of Ejusdem generis which means "of the same kind, class or nature” but rather should apply the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius which means that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others.

With the distinction clearly provided, respondents could not insist that "gasoline service station" under Section 44 necessarily included "gasoline filling station" under Section 21.

The Court also held that the HLURB decision in the previous case filed against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno) by respondent Jovellanos had effectively barred the issues in Resolution No. 50 based on the principle of res judicata or the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit. With the similarity of the identity of interest of the case at bar and that of the previous case already decided by HLURB, the litigation should already end  since the concerns had already been resolved. The Court stated that an individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause.

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Case Digest: Caltex vs. Palomar

G.R. No. L-19650             September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL

FACTS:

In 1960, Caltex launched their "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", which called for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.Participants were neither required consideration nor to pay a fee. No purchase of Caltex products were also required to be made. Entry forms were to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can would be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view the Anti-lottery provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. Postmaster General Enrico Palomar denied the request, arguing that the said contest violated the provisions of the law on subject. CALTEX sought judicial intervention wherein the trial court ruled in its favor. Respondent Palomar appealed, posing the same argument that the said contest violated the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.

Issue:

Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" fell on the purview of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.

HELD:

The Postal Law does not allow “any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind".

The Court held that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" by CALTEX is not a “lottery” nor a “gift enterprise” but rather a gratuitous distribution of property by chance, which the law does not prohibit. The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. The contest in question, lacking the element of “consideration”, cannot be deemed a lottery. The rules of the contest made no mention of a valuable consideration of some kind being paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize. The term “gift enterprise” also could not embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.

By virtue of noscitur a sociis — which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned — it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indication of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.

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