GR No. L-30061 (February 27, 1974)
People vs. Jabinal
FACTS:
Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the court’s rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.
RULING:
Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system … .” The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet” — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
The appellant was acquitted.
