Civility and Proper Conduct of Court Employees

Fernandez v. Rubillos
A.M. No. P-08-2451, October 17, 2008
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2201-P)
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.

Facts: Roel Fernandez filed an administrative complaint for grave misconduct and harassment against Renato Rubillos, a process server of the Municipal Trial Court of Albuera, Leyte. Their conflict arose from a family land dispute. Despite a barangay settlement, Rubillos continued insulting and physically intimidating Fernandez, including during an encounter within court premises. Rubillos denied the accusations but presented no supporting proof. The investigating judge recommended a reprimand for discourtesy, while the Office of the Court Administrator recommended a ₱5,000 fine.

Issue: Whether Rubillos’s behavior warranted administrative liability as a court employee.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court found that Rubillos’s persistent insults and physical aggression constituted conduct unbecoming a public officer and court employee. His unsupported denials could not overcome the evidence against him. Personal animosity did not justify his behavior, particularly while Fernandez was conducting official business in court.

Doctrine: Court employees must observe civility, restraint, professionalism, and respect in both their official and private conduct. Their behavior reflects upon the judiciary; discourtesy and belligerence undermine public confidence in the courts.

Disposition: Rubillos was fined ₱5,000, with a warning that repetition would be dealt with more severely.

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Case Digest: Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.

 Mandatory Tax Sharing and Trust Fund Accountability | Condonation of Prior-Term Administrative Misconduct | Abuse of Authority

Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.

G.R. Nos. 117589–92 · May 22, 1996 · 326 Phil. 847
Supreme Court En Banc · Davide, Jr., J.

Facts

Albay Governor Romeo Salalima, the vice governor, and several provincial board members challenged Administrative Order No. 153 through a petition for certiorari. The order imposed successive suspensions without pay arising from four administrative cases. The cases concerned Albay’s withholding of Tiwi and Daraga’s shares in payments from the National Power Corporation (NPC), the province’s engagement of private counsel, the handling of disciplinary proceedings against Tiwi Mayor Naomi Corral, and a negotiated contract for additional rehabilitation work at the Tabaco Public Market. 

Issues and rulings

1. Could the suspensions be served successively? Yes. Under Section 66(b) of the Local Government Code, the six-month limit applies per administrative offense. The penalties could be served consecutively because each was within that limit and service ended no later than the expiration of the officials’ terms.
2. Did the pending Commission on Audit appeal bar the disciplinary proceedings? No. The audit and the disciplinary inquiry served different purposes. The committee could consider undisputed audit findings alongside independent evidence and draw its own legal conclusions.
3. Were Tiwi and Daraga entitled to shares in NPC’s ₱40,724,471.74 payment? Yes. The payment represented delinquent real property taxes or redemption proceeds. Under Section 87(c) of P.D. No. 464, the proceeds had to be distributed in the same proportions as ordinary tax collections. Albay should have held the beneficiaries’ shares in trust pending remittance instead of placing them in its general fund.
4. What was the effect of the 1992 elections? Under the condonation doctrine then in force, reelection extinguished administrative liability for prior-term misconduct even when the complaint was filed after reelection. This covered Salalima’s acts involving the retainer and market contracts, as well as the reelected board members’ participation in authorizing the retainer. The newly elected members bore no liability for the 1989 resolution because they had taken no part in it.
5. Did the finding of abuse of authority on a differently framed charge violate due process? The Court left the issue unresolved because it had already set aside the suspensions in the retainer case. 

Disposition

The Court partly granted the petition. It annulled Salalima’s suspensions in O.P. Cases Nos. 5450 and 5469 and the other petitioners’ suspensions in 5469, without prejudice to appropriate civil or criminal actions. The sanctions in 5470 and 5471 stood. 

Subsequent doctrine. The Court prospectively abandoned condonation in Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals. Madreo v. Bayron clarified that the doctrine is unavailable when the official’s reelection occurred on or after April 12, 2016.

_______________

SUMMARY:
O.P. Case No. 5470

O.P. Case No. 5470 arose from Tiwi Mayor Naomi Corral’s complaint against Governor Salalima and other Albay provincial officials for withholding the beneficiaries’ shares in ₱40,724,471.74 paid by NPC for delinquent real property taxes.

The officials claimed that the payments belonged exclusively to Albay because the province had acquired NPC’s properties at a tax auction. They placed the payments in the general fund and spent amounts exceeding the province’s lawful share.

The Court upheld their administrative liability for abuse of authority. Under Section 87(c) of P.D. No. 464, the payments had to be shared with Tiwi, Daraga, the concerned barangays, and the national government. Their shares should have been segregated as trust funds. The suspensions of five months for Salalima and four months for the other officials concerned were sustained.

O.P. Case No. 5469 

O.P. Case No. 5469 concerned Albay’s hiring of Atty. Jesus Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm to handle its tax dispute with NPC. The agreement provided for a ₱50,000 acceptance fee and an 18% contingent fee, approximately ₱38.5 million. The province paid ₱7.38 million, which COA disallowed for lack of the required prior approvals.

The investigating committee found abuse of authority, citing the excessive fees, irregular hiring, and payments to a firm that had never appeared as counsel of record. The President imposed suspensions.

The Supreme Court set aside the suspensions. Under the condonation doctrine then applicable, the officials’ 1992 reelection extinguished administrative liability arising from the prior-term transaction. Newly elected board members could not be held liable for a resolution adopted before they assumed office. Appropriate civil or criminal actions remained possible.

O.P. Case No. 5471

O.P. Case No. 5471 concerned the oppression and abuse of authority committed by Governor Salalima and provincial board members in handling administrative cases against Tiwi Mayor Naomi Corral.

The proceedings were marked by haste and arbitrariness. Corral was preventively suspended before she could answer one complaint and was denied opportunities to present evidence in others. The board members also refused to inhibit themselves despite being respondents in administrative complaints she had previously filed against them.

The President imposed four months’ suspension without pay on the officials concerned. The Supreme Court left the ruling standing, explaining that its substantive merits were unchallenged in the petition and that the pending COA appeal had no connection to this case.

________

ON THE DISCUSSION OF ABUSE OF AUTHORITY

Abuse of authority occurs when a public official exercises power excessively, improperly, or contrary to law. It is a ground for administrative discipline under Section 60(e) of the Local Government Code.

Abuse of authority is the excessive or improper exercise of power entrusted to a public official. It occurs when an official uses that power contrary to law or for an improper purpose, such as harassment, favoritism, or oppression.

An official may have the authority to discipline employees, approve expenditures, or collect taxes, but must exercise it within legal limits and with respect for due process. For example, imposing a suspension arbitrarily or spending funds legally reserved for another beneficiary constitutes misuse of official power.

Under Section 60(e) of the Local Government Code, abuse of authority is a ground for administrative discipline against elective local officials. Public power carries a duty to act lawfully, fairly, and in the public interest.

In O.P. Case No. 5470, the officials abused their authority by withholding the beneficiaries’ lawful tax shares and using those funds for provincial expenditures. In O.P. Case No. 5469, the investigating committee found abuse in the irregular hiring of private lawyers and approval of excessive fees, although the Supreme Court set aside the suspensions under the condonation doctrine then applicable. In O.P. Case No. 5471, the abuse involved arbitrary disciplinary proceedings and suspension orders against Mayor Corral that disregarded due process.

These cases illustrate that public officials must exercise their financial and disciplinary powers within legal limits and for legitimate public purposes. 

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Case Digest: Ochoa vs. Dy Buco

 Ochoa, Jr., et al. v. Dy Buco and Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation v. Dy Buco

G.R. Nos. 216634 and 216636

October 14, 2020 · Supreme Court, Second Division · Inting, J. · 887 Phil. 117.

Facts

The Bureau of Customs issued Letters of Authority and Mission Orders to verify payment of duties and taxes on goods at warehouses in Bulacan and Malabon. At the Bulacan warehouse, Atty. Christopher Dy Buco’s team presented the order addressed to McConnell while trying to identify the occupant. A separate order covered Sanyo Seiki at the same address. The guards denied entry, and the team left without entering. Customs personnel later watched the warehouse, and another officer intercepted a Sanyo Seiki truck carrying stainless steel. 

Sanyo Seiki filed an administrative complaint. The Office of the President (OP) dismissed Dy Buco from service. The Court of Appeals reversed, dismissed the complaint against him, and ordered his reinstatement with back pay and benefits. The OP and Sanyo Seiki separately sought Supreme Court review. 

Issues and Ruling

1. Who had standing to appeal? The OP had standing because, as the disciplining authority, it had a direct legal interest in defending its ruling. Sanyo Seiki lacked standing because a private complainant in an administrative disciplinary case serves as a witness for the government.
2. Did substantial evidence establish Dy Buco’s administrative liability? No. Customs had valid orders under Section 2536 of the then Tariff and Customs Code. Dy Buco’s team withdrew when refused entry. Dy Buco neither joined the stakeout nor participated in the interception. He refused to release the cargo because the required documentation was lacking.
3. Could the OP hold Dy Buco liable for gross incompetence and inefficiency or attribute his colleagues’ acts to him through conspiracy? No. The formal charge omitted both the offense and the conspiracy allegation, depriving him of notice and a fair opportunity to defend himself. Doctrine

Grave misconduct requires substantial evidence of work-related misconduct accompanied by corruption, a clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule. Administrative due process requires notice of the charge and a meaningful opportunity to answer it. 

Disposition. 

The Supreme Court denied both petitions and affirmed the Court of Appeals.

Doctrine

The Office of the President, as the disciplining authority, may appeal a ruling that reverses its administrative decision. A private complainant lacks standing to appeal because it serves as a witness for the government.

Grave misconduct requires substantial evidence of misconduct connected with official duties and accompanied by corruption, a clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule. Administrative due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. An officer cannot be held liable for an offense omitted from the formal charge or for others’ acts based on a conspiracy that the formal charge did not allege.

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Case: Digest: CIRIACO VS. MARQUEZ

CIRIACO VS. MARQUEZ

G.R. Nos. 171746–48 and 171770–72, and G.R. No. 185290 | March 29, 2023 | 939 Phil. 1
Supreme Court, First Division, Zalameda, J.

Facts

In 1999, the Social Security System (SSS) used its Investment Reserve Fund to buy 25,855,382 shares of Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB) at ₱290.075 per share in a negotiated block purchase. Ciriaco and other SSS officers and members alleged that the shares were worth ₱245 each and that SSS had overpaid by about ₱1.165 billion. The respondent officials maintained that the difference was a justified premium for acquiring a large block of shares

The Ombudsman found Horacio Templo, Edgar Solilapsi, and Lilia Marquez liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and suspended them for six months without pay. It questioned the speed of the transaction and Marquez’s role in preparing the final investment memorandum. The Court of Appeals reversed. In a separate proceeding, it dismissed Marissu Bugante’s appeal as untimely.

Issues and rulings

1. Did Ciriaco and the other complainants have standing to appeal? No. Private complainants in administrative disciplinary proceedings generally act as witnesses for the government. An exception may apply when a complainant has a direct, personal, and substantial interest. Their general interest as SSS officers and members in seeing the law enforced was insufficient.

2. Did Bugante’s appeal survive her death? No. The appeal concerned administrative discipline and implicated no property right of Bugante’s heirs that could support substitution. The Court closed and terminated G.R. No. 185290. 

3. Was Rule 65 the proper remedy for the Ombudsman? No. The Ombudsman could have sought review of the Court of Appeals’ decision under Rule 45 and invoked a recognized exception to the general bar on factual review. Rule 65 certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal.

4. Were Templo, Solilapsi, and Marquez administratively liable? No. Months of investment studies preceded the purchase, and a firm bid deadline justified acting promptly. The size of the block, comparative valuations, and the two board seats SSS obtained supported the premium. Marquez helped prepare the memorandum using information supplied by Solilapsi and his staff, and Solilapsi approved it. A later decline in share value did not establish misconduct.

Doctrine:

Under the prudent man rule in Section 26 of the SSS Law then in force, courts assess an investment decision against the care, skill, and diligence that a knowledgeable person in a comparable role would exercise under the circumstances prevailing when the decision was made. A disappointing return, by itself, does not establish administrative liability where the officials exercised the required diligence.

(Doctrine — Prudent man rule. Under Section 26 of the SSS Law then in force, SSS officials must invest reserve funds with the skill, care, prudence, and diligence that a knowledgeable investment professional in a comparable position would exercise under the circumstances existing when the decision was made. A later loss or failure to earn projected profits does not by itself establish administrative liability if the officials exercised the required diligence.)

The Court applied that rule to the PCIB purchase. Months of prior studies supported the investment, the bid deadline justified prompt action, and the size of the share block and the two board seats SSS obtained helped justify the premium.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied G.R. Nos. 171746–48 and 171770–72 and affirmed the exoneration of Templo, Solilapsi, and Marquez. It held that they were entitled to the salaries and other emoluments withheld during their six-month suspensions. It closed and terminated G.R. No. 185290 and declared the dismissal of the complaint against the other respondents covered by that petition final.

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Bank cannot recover funds when undue payment resulted from its own gross negligence

 BDO Unibank, Inc. v. Cristina Barcellano y Riego

G.R. No. 261264, February 12, 2026
Third Division, Dimaampao, J

Facts

Cristina Barcellano deposited a ₱151,200.00 Landbank regional check into her BDO savings account. A BDO teller erroneously processed it as a local check, causing it to clear within three banking days instead of the seven days required for regional checks.

Because of the premature crediting, Barcellano withdrew ₱76,000.00. The following day, Landbank returned the check because of a stop-payment order. BDO demanded that Barcellano return the withdrawn amount, but she failed to do so.

BDO filed a criminal complaint for estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC acquitted Barcellano for failure to prove fraud, deceit, or abuse of confidence. It also refused to order her to return the money, finding that BDO’s gross negligence caused the premature withdrawal. The CA affirmed.

Before the Supreme Court, BDO pursued the civil aspect of the case, arguing that Barcellano’s retention of the amount constituted unjust enrichment and that the erroneous credit created an obligation to return the money under solutio indebiti and constructive trust.

Issues

1. Whether Barcellano may be held civilly liable despite her acquittal in the estafa case.
2. Whether she must return the ₱76,000.00 under the principles of unjust enrichment, solutio indebiti, or constructive trust.

Ruling

No. The petition was denied.

Barcellano’s acquittal based on the absence of fraud or misrepresentation precluded civil liability ex delicto. Nevertheless, under Article 29 of the Civil Code, the court may still determine in the same criminal action whether civil liability arose from another source of obligation independent of the offense charged.

In this case, however, BDO failed to establish any independent basis for civil liability.

Ratio Decidendi

Under Article 2154 of the Civil Code, solutio indebiti requires:

1. Payment when no binding relation exists between the payor and recipient; and
2. Payment made through mistake, rather than liberality or another cause.

BDO’s loss was not attributable to a legally cognizable mistake but to its own gross negligence. BDO:

• Credited the check without first clearing it with the drawee bank;
• Improperly treated an evidently regional check as a local check; and
• Failed to discover the error until it received the stop-payment order.

Banks are businesses imbued with public interest and must exercise extraordinary diligence in handling transactions. BDO’s failure to observe basic safeguards and its own clearing policies was the proximate cause of the loss.

Moreover, BDO failed to prove that Barcellano knowingly received money to which she was not entitled. The reason for the stop-payment order was never established, nor was it shown that Barcellano knew of any defect in the check. Her attempt to withdraw the remaining balance supported the inference that she honestly believed she owned the funds credited to her account.

Since BDO failed to establish that Barcellano knowingly and unjustly retained an undue benefit, neither unjust enrichment nor solutio indebiti applied. Consequently, no constructive trust arose in BDO’s favor.

Doctrine:

A bank cannot recover under solutio indebiti when the undue payment resulted from its own gross negligence rather than a legally cognizable mistake. As institutions imbued with public interest, banks must exercise extraordinary diligence and observe basic safeguards in processing and clearing checks.

An accused’s acquittal extinguishes civil liability ex delicto when the act giving rise to such liability is found not to exist. Courts may nonetheless adjudicate civil liability arising from sources independent of the crime, but the elements of that independent source must still be proven.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied BDO’s petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. Barcellano was not ordered to return the ₱76,000.00.

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Case Digest: xxx vs. People | Withdrawal of Marriage Application Causing Emotional Trauma Constitutes Psychological Violence Under RA 9262

 Case: XXX v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No.: E-00648
Date: July 29, 2026
Ponente: Hernando, J., First Division
Law: Section 5(i), Republic Act No. 9262
Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari

Facts

XXX, a police officer, and AAA, a public-school teacher, were in a romantic and sexual relationship. After AAA became pregnant, their families agreed that they should marry.

The couple applied for a marriage license after XXX had previously failed to appear on the agreed date. On the day they successfully lodged the application, however, XXX retrieved the documents and informed the Local Civil Registrar that the marriage would no longer proceed. He did so without notifying AAA, despite knowing that she was pregnant and had already announced their intended marriage to her family and friends.

AAA suffered humiliation, sleeplessness, loss of appetite, restlessness, depressive symptoms, and suicidal ideation. A social-welfare officer and a psychometrician confirmed her psychological and emotional distress.

The RTC convicted XXX of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of RA 9262. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and awarded AAA moral and exemplary damages.

Issue

Whether XXX’s unilateral withdrawal of the marriage-license application constituted psychological violence under Section 5(i) of RA 9262, notwithstanding the rule that a breach of promise to marry is generally not actionable.

Ruling

Yes. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the conviction.

The Court held that XXX was not punished merely for breaking a promise to marry. He was held liable because his willful and arbitrary withdrawal of the marriage-license application—done after a public commitment, without notice, and with knowledge of AAA’s pregnancy—caused her serious mental and emotional suffering.

The prosecution established the elements of the offense:

1. XXX and AAA had a dating and sexual relationship;
2. XXX willfully withdrew the marriage-license application without notifying AAA after publicly committing to the marriage; and
3. His conduct caused AAA mental and emotional anguish, as demonstrated by her testimony and corroborated by professional assessments.

The act went beyond ordinary heartbreak or incompatible expectations. It amounted to emotional manipulation and public humiliation falling within the statutory definition of psychological violence.

Doctrine

A breach of promise to marry, by itself, is not the offense punished under Section 5(i) of RA 9262. Liability arises when an accused willfully uses conduct connected with the contemplated marriage as a means of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon a woman with whom he has a dating or sexual relationship.

RA 9262 focuses on the psychological effect of the offender’s willful conduct upon the victim, not merely on the formal nature of the act committed.

Disposition

The conviction was affirmed with modification. XXX was sentenced to:

• Imprisonment of two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine years and four months of prision mayor, as maximum;
• A fine of ₱100,000;
• ₱75,000 in moral damages and ₱75,000 in exemplary damages, with 6% annual legal interest from finality until full payment; and
• Mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.

FULL TEXT: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/e-00648-xxx-vs-people-of-the-philippines/

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Am I Ready for Lawschool?

"𝘋𝘰 𝘐 𝘏𝘢𝘷𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘪𝘨𝘩𝘵 𝘗𝘳𝘦-𝘓𝘢𝘸 𝘋𝘦𝘨𝘳𝘦𝘦?"

“𝘏𝘰𝘸 𝘥𝘰𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯𝘦 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘭𝘢𝘸 𝘴𝘤𝘩𝘰𝘰𝘭?”

“𝘈𝘮 𝘐 𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯 𝘲𝘶𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘦𝘥 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘭𝘢𝘸 𝘴𝘤𝘩𝘰𝘰𝘭?”

Over the years, people have asked me what they should do before entering law school. What books should they read in advance? What must they prepare to properly equip themselves for the battle that is law school?

I have also seen people lose heart because they believe they are not ready for the endeavor.

Perhaps much has changed through the years. Law school may no longer be the same as it was when I enrolled, and what I know from experience may already be outdated or irrelevant to today’s setup. Then again, no two law schools are exactly alike.

So, for the first time, I will share how I prepared for law school—based solely on my own experience. Perhaps, just perhaps, some of you might gain a little insight into what it is like to enter one of the most demanding academic realms: the School of Law.

So, how did I prepare?

I didn’t.

I am sorry if that comes as a disappointment, but it is true.

This piece is for anyone who feels ill-equipped to pursue law because of a lack of preparation, confidence in their stock knowledge, or whatever else they believe they should already possess.

It is written by someone who wanted to become a lawyer without even knowing that she would have to take the Bar examination to become one (yes, I didn’t know I had to take a licensure exam)—and yet, four years later, distinguished herself academically, passed the Bar, and now humbly serves in the country’s largest public law firm. I didn’t say this neither to brag nor to inspire. I say this only matter-of-factly to prove a point.

Everything I knew about becoming a lawyer, I learned in law school.

So, take heart and read on...

Apart from meeting the basic admission requirements at the time—such as having a bachelor’s degree and completing the prescribed general education units—I did nothing special before walking into class on my first day. I had done nothing I would say gave me an advantage. I entered the room, sat myself, and waited for the class to begin.

Would I have done things differently if I had been given the chance?

Probably not.

At that point, I do not think advance preparation would have made much of a difference. Had I been specifically instructed to read something beforehand, I would have done so. Other than that, I would not have lost heart simply because I had not read ahead.

This is not to say that law school came easily to me. It did not. But the difficulties I encountered were not the result of my failure to prepare before entering law school. Whatever preparation I needed, I learned to do along the way.

What carried me through the first-day jitters—and, eventually, through law school itself—was my desire to learn. That desire was rooted in my determination to become a lawyer.

Throughout those four years, I dedicated myself not only to learning the law but also to mastering 𝘩𝘰𝘸 to learn it. I humbled myself before the endeavor and focused on my own journey.

I refined the way I studied. I learned how to filter and select my materials. I improved the way I wrote my answers—both in substance and quite literally. I took the Bar when the examinations were still handwritten, and one’s handwriting could help determine whether one would make it or break it.

I dedicated myself to studying the law and to learning everything else I believed was essential to achieving my dream of becoming a lawyer.

There is, of course, nothing wrong with preparing early, reading in advance, or taking other steps to equip yourself. After all, nothing done in the pursuit of knowledge ever truly goes to waste.

But the people I most want to address are those who feel like giving up before they have even begun—those who believe they are not equipped for the pursuit, and those who think it is impossible to thrive because they have not met what they imagine to be the standard of a law student.

If I may be frank though, there is one quality I believe you must at least possess---and I say this not only of law school, but of every endeavor undertaken in the pursuit of learning:

You must have the humility to acknowledge that you are there to learn.

Only then can you become truly teachable.

You do not have to know everything before entering law school. You enter law school precisely because you are there to learn.

So, if becoming a lawyer is truly your dream, do not allow the fear of being unprepared to stop you before you have even begun.

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IBP Statement on Rappler CEO Maria Ressa and Rey Santos Jr. Libel Case Conviction

 IBP Statement on Rappler CEO Maria Ressa and Rey Santos Jr. Libel Case Conviction

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People of the Philippines vs. Maria Ressa, et al

Photo from ABS-CBN: Maria Angelita Ressa

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