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Showing posts with label Search and Seizure. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Search and Seizure. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 4, 2016

CASE DIGEST: Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff


Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984

Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.

As to the issue that the  items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.




Monday, March 21, 2016

CASE DIGEST: Nolasco, et al vs. Paño


Nolasco, et al vs. Paño
G.R. No. L-69803
October 8, 1985

Facts:
The present case was subject for resolution.

Supreme Court  held in a criminal case that the arrest of the petitioners was illegal, annulling the decision of respondent Judge Paño, and that the seizure of the items by virtue of the warrant by the same respondent judge are inadmissible as evidence in the Subversive Documents case. However the Court held that the items were to be retained in case it would be used as evidence in a separate criminal case pending before the Special Military Commission No.1, returning the rest which are determined irrelevant by petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the portion of the decision regarding the retention of the properties seized. One of the petitioners also assailed the respondent’s claim that the search was incidental to her arrest for the crime of rebellion.

Issue:
Whether or not some of the properties seized may be introduced as evidence in a separate criminal case.

Held:

The Court ruled the propriety of the declaration of the arrest and search as null and void. It was held that the warrant was one of a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Bill of rights also orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]).

All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of the three petitioners, as held in the recent case of Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985).

Since the search was not an incident of an arrest as it was in fact made under a void general warrant, the seizure of documents could not be justified as an incident of an arrest





The Court ordered the return of all seized items to petitioners.

Case Digest: JOSE BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF


Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984

Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.

As to the issue that the  items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.




Case Digest: Alih vs. Castro


Alih vs. Castro
151 SCRA 279
 June 23, 1987

Facts:
Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives.  A shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger –printing, paraffin testing  and photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights

The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem  due to the assassination of the city mayor.

Issue:
Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence against them.

Held:
The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did not excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be protected from the  arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant and so the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 “The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”