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Wednesday, June 26, 2019
Tuesday, June 25, 2019
Case Digest: Marlow Nvigation, Inc, et al vs. Cabatay
G.R. No. 212878 February 1, 2016
MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS.,
INC. MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., LTD., W. BOCKSTLEGEL REEDEREI (Germany), GALVEZ,
JR., vs. WILFREDO L. CABATAY
Petitioners- MARLOW
NAVIGATION PHILS., INC. MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., LTD., W. BOCKSTLEGEL REEDEREI
(Germany), GALVEZ, JR.,
Respondent – Wilfredo
Cabatay
FACTS:
Cabatay entered into an employment Contract with
Petitioners. The said contract was supplemented by the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) Total Crew Cost Fleet Agremment (TCC-FA), .
While on duty, Cabatay suffered injury when he fell from
a height in his work area. He was declared unfit to work for 25 days. He was
then referred to a company doctor, dr. Tay, and
underwent further examination and treatment. After complaining of right
shoulder pain, Cabatay underwent rotator cuff surgery. However, after such
surgery, he missed several appointments and failed to undergo physiotherapy on
time.
Dr. Tay eventually issued a combined 36% disability
assessment for Cabatay.
Cabatay sought for permanent total disability benefits,
claiming that he had lost his job due to his injury.
LABOR ARBITER: Cabatay won.
The LA ruled that, despite
the 36% disability rating, he was entitled to permanent total disability as he
was permanently unfit for sea service in any capacity.
NLRC: Only permanent
PARTIAL disability based
Dr. Tay’s 36% disability assessment
Court of Appeals (On Rule 65): reinstated the LA ruling. the CA
declared that while Cabatay’s treatment was extended (up to a maximum of 240
days), it did not negate the fact that he was disabled
continuously for more than 120 days and therefore permanently disabled, especially
when Dr. Tay had not declared Cabatay fit to work within the extended period.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not Cabatay is entitled to
permanent total disability compensation.
RULING:
The NLRC Ruling was correct. Cabatay is entitled to permanent partial disability based on Dr. Tay's 36% disability assessment, the governing law—the POEA-SEC—and the contract between the parties—the TCC-FA—as well as applicable jurisprudence,
"Entitlement to disability benefits
by seamen on overseas work is a matter governed, not only by medical findings
but, by law and by contract," and so the Court declared in Vergara v.
Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., et al.
Under the 2002 POEA-SEC, it
is the company-designated physician who declares/establishes the fitness to
work or the degree of disability of a seafarer who is repatriated for medical
reasons and needs further medical attention.Thus,
under Section 20 (B) 3, the seafarer is required to submit to a post-employment
medical examination by the company-designated physician.
On the other hand, under the TCC-FA, "The
disability suffered by the Seafarer shall be determined by a doctor appointed
mutually by the Owners/Managers and the ITF, and the Owners/Managers shall
provide disability compensation to the Seafarer in accordance with the
percentage specified in the table below xxx." The TCC-FA
also provides for a Compensation Scale under its Annex 3 upon which Dr. Tay,
the company-designated physician, based her assessment of Cabatay’s disability.
It is of no moment that Cabatay was
unable to work for more than 120 days without a declaration by Dr. Tay of
Cabatay’s fitness or non-fitness to work. In Vergara, the Court stressed: "This declaration of a permanent total
disability after the initial 120 days of temporary disability cannot, however,
be simply lifted and applied as a general rule for all cases in all contexts.
The specific context of the application should be considered, as we must do in
the application of all rulings and even of the law and of the implementing
regulations."
Also, in Splash Philippines, Inc. v.
Ruizo, the Court
said that the 120-day rule "cannot be used as a cure-all formula for all maritime compensation
cases. Its application must depend on the circumstances of the case, including
especially compliance with the parties ' contractual duties and obligations as
laid down in the POEA-SEC and/or their CBA, if one exists.
Dr. Tay had made a timely and duly made 36% disability
assessment which Cabatay did not dispute. Cabatay cannot claim full disability
benefits when, not only did he not dispute Dr. Tay’s assessment, he also did
not submit himself to a mutually appointed doctor pursuant to the CBA.
Absent
such a determination (certification) by a mutually appointed doctor, we hold
that Dr. Tay's assessment should stand.