Case Digest: JOSEPHINE AND HENRY GO vs. LEONARDO YAMANE

G.R. NO. 160762; MAY 3 2006

JOSEPHINE AND HENRY GO vs. LEONARDO YAMANE

FACTS:

In the civil case “Florence Pucay De Gomez, Elsie Pucay Kiwas and Muriel Pucay Yamane v. Cypress Corporation”, Atty. Guillermo F. De Guzman was the counsel who handled the plaintiffs in the said case.

To satisfy the lien for attorney's fees, a parcel of land, registered in the name of Muriel Pucay Yamane (wife of Leonardo Yamane), was scheduled to be sold at public auction on August 11, 1981. Spouses Josephine and Henry Go, herein petitioners, were awarded the said land as the highest bidders in the auction. Respondent Leonardo Yamane filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of Sale to petitioners, invoking a third-party claim. Respondent contended that the land was a conjugal property and could not be held responsible for the personal obligations of Muriel and the two other Pucays. RTC ruled against respondent, reasoning that the subject parcel of land was the paraphernal property of the late Muriel Pucay Yamane -- spouse of respondent -- and was not their conjugal property.

The Court of Appeals ruled otherwise, saying that the property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal unless the exclusive funds of one spouse are shown to have been used for the purpose.  The property was acquired by couple from a certain Eugene Pucay during their marriage and, therefore, was a conjugal property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property in Muriel Pucay’s name was a conjugal property and should not be held responsible for the obligations of Muriel Pucay and her sisters.

HELD:

The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decisions.

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."

"As a general rule, all property acquired by the spouses, regardless of in whose name the same is registered, during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

As to the responsibility of the then established conjugal property, the contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and the Pucay sisters appear[s] to have been incurred for the exclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was acting privately for her exclusive interest when she joined her two sisters in hiring the services of Atty. De Guzman to handle a case for them. Accordingly, whatever expenses were incurred by Muriel in the litigation for her and her sisters' private and exclusive interests, are her exclusive responsibility and certainly cannot be charged against the contested conjugal property.

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Case Digest: HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO

G.R. NO. 153802

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO

FACTS:

Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot in San Pablo City, registered in the name of Marcelino Dailo to the exclusion of his wife.

In 1993, through a grant of Special Power of Attorney to Lilibeth Osmundo, Marcelino obtained a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank, secured by the property in San Pablo. Gesmundo also executed a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner without the knowledge and consent of respondent. The loan matured and remained outstanding which led to the foreclosure of the mortgage.

In 1993, Marcelino died.

Respondent found out later about the mortgage and claimed that she had no knowledge of it. She further claims that the property was conjugal in nature and so she consequently filed for the Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. The Court of appeals favored Miguela. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the mortgage entered into by respondent’s husband without her knowledge was valid.

2.) Whether or not the property may be held liable for the obligation obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo.

HELD:

The court held that the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.

Marcelino and Miguela Dailo were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. In the absence of a marriage settlement, their properties were governed by the system of Conjugal Partnership of gains, which was made also made applicable after the effectivity of the Code.

Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. The Court ruled that the mortgage entered into by Marcelino without his wife’s consent and, thus, was void.

As to the issue of liability of the property for the obligation obtained by Marcelino, the court held that for failure to present clear proof that the said obligation redounded to the benefit of the family which under Article 121 of the Family Code, the subject property could not be held liable.

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Case Digest: Alcazar vs. Alcazar (2009)

G.R. NO. 174451; October 13, 2009

Alcazar vs. Alcazar

FACTS:

Petitioner Veronica Alcazar was married to Respondent Rey Alcazar on October 11, 2000. The couple lived together for five days in Bacolod before the two went to Manila to live there separately. A few days after, respondent left for Riyadh without ever contacting petitioner. Petitioner’s attempt to communicate with respondent during their physical separation turned out in vain. A year and a half later, respondent returned back to the Philippines.

Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Petitioner availed of an expert witness, who presented the psychological evaluation of petitioner and respondent.

The RTC rendered its decision denying petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage, reasoning that the acts of the respondent in not communicating with petitioner and not living with the latter the moment he returned home from Saudi Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of their marriage or that these are incurable. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, as defined by the law and jurisprudence, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

HELD:

The law invoked by petitioner, Article 45(5) of the Family Code, refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse. The Court held that there had been no evidence presented to establish that respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. As can be gleaned though from the evidence presented by petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appeared that petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code and not Article 45(5) of the Family Code.

Petitioner attributed the filing of the erroneous Complaint before the RTC to her former counsel’s mistake or gross ignorance. But even said reason could not save petitioners Complaint from dismissal. It is a settled doctrine that the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural technique. Petitioner failed to convince the court that such exceptional circumstances exist.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the court could treat the Complaint as one for declaration of nullity based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the court will still dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit, consistent with the evidence presented by petitioner during the trial.

The evidence presented by petitioner was not enough to merit a favorable ruling. The court further held that psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.

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