Case Digest: Tolentino and Mojica vs. Comelec

G.R. No.  148334.  January 21, 2004

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN

FACTS:

Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and special elections of 2001 were conducted by the COMELEC.Petitioners contend that, if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. Thirteen senators were proclaimed from the said election with the 13th placer to serve that of the remaining term of Sen. Guingona, who vacated a seat in the senate.

Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and, consequently, the declaration of the 13^th elected senator.

Issue:

1Whether or not  Court had jurisdiction.

2Whether or not the petition was moot.

3Whether or not petioners had locus standi.

4Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term

Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001

RULING:

On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what petitioners were questioning was the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected and not to determine Honasan’s right in the exercise of his office as Senator proper under a quo warranto.

On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.

On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to voters’ suits involving the right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again

On the Validity of the Election, the Court held that the May 14, 2001 Election was valid.

The Court held that COMELEC’s Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special Election as required under RA 6645, as amended, did Not Negate the Calling of such Election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.   The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELEC’s failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it. Further, there was No Proof that COMELEC’s Failure to Give Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner of Determining the Winner in the Special Election Misled Voters. IT could not be said that the voters were not informed since there had been other accessible information resources. Finally, the Court held that unless there had been a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the affairs and conduct of the Comelec. 

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Case Digest: Ampatuan, et al. vs. COMELEC

Ampatuan, et al. vs. COMELEC

G. R. No. 149803.  January 31, 2002

FACTS:

The COMELEC lifted its order suspending the proclamation and thereafter proclaimed petitioners as the victors in the May 14, 2001 Maguindanao Provincial election. Respondents petitioned before the Supreme Court the suspension of  the effects of  the said proclamation and insisted that there had been a “failure of election”. The COMELEC ordered the consolidation of respondents’ petitions and  a random technical examination on several precincts.

Petitioners contended that by virtue of their proclamation, the proper remedy available to respondents was not a petition for declaration of failure of elections but an election protest.

Issue:

Whether or not COMELEC had jurisdiction to act on respondents’ petitions even after proclamation of petitioners as winners

Ruling:

The Comelec en banc has the authority to annul election results and/or declare a failure of elections.

The Court held that respondents’ allegations of massive fraud and terrorism, which led to a failure to elect, fell squarely within Sec 6. Of the Omnibus Election Code (Failure of Election). “The Comelec is duty-bound to conduct an investigation as to the veracity of respondents’ allegations of massive fraud and terrorism that attended the conduct of the May 14, 2001 election”. There can be no assumption that petitioners’ proclamation and assumption into office on June 30, 2001, was legal precisely because the conduct by which the elections were held was put in issue by respondents.

The Court, in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, directed COMELEC to proceed with the hearing of the consolidated petitions and the technical examination with deliberate dispatch.

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Case Digest: Clemente vs. WCC and Rattan Art and Decorations Inc.

Clemente vs. WCC and Rattan Art and Decorations Inc., G.R. No. L-42087, April 8, 1988

Facts: 

Ricardo Clemente, a machine set-up man at Rattan Art and Decorations Inc, died of acute cardiorespiratory failure, with manifest pulmonary infarct, cardiac dilatation and marked visceral congestion. The heirs’ claim for death compensation benefits under WCA was granted. On appeal, the Commission ruled in favor of private respondent and held that the deceased died from “bangungot” which is non-compensable, there being no proof of fundamental preliminary link between the cause of death and the decedent’s work.

Issue:

Whether or not there exist a causal connection between the cause of death and the nature of work of the deceased.

Ruling:

The Court held that the deceased died of “heart failure”,not of “bangungot”. And that there exist the probability that his work, as a set-up man, caused or aggravated his illness that led to his death. The death was, therefore, compensable.

Under the WCA, there is the presumption that the illness which supervened at the time of his employment, either arose out of or was at least aggravated by, such employment. The burden of disproving such presumption was on the private respondent. Even granting that deceased did die of ‘bangungot’, such phenomena is without legal or medical basis. Where the causes of an ailment are unknown and undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of causal link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized.

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Case Digest: Berberisa Riño vs. ECC and SSS

BEBERISA RIÑO vs. ECC and SSS, G.R. No. 132558, May 9, 2000

Facts:

Virgilio T. Riño Sr., was a stevedore at Allied Port Services since July 1982. In 1992, he died of “Uremia secondary to chronic renal failure” three days after he was rushed to the hospital after collapsing at work. Virgilio’s widow claimed for death benefits from the SSS. The claim was denied by the system and, subsequently, by the ECC for failure to present proof of causal connection between the decedent’s illness and his work as a stevedore.

Issue:

Whether or not Riño’s Death was compensable under PD626 by virtue of the increased risk theory.

Ruling:

The Court held that the decedent’s death was non-compensable.

The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Riño’s death are not listed as occupational diseases. Hence, petitioner should have presented substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, showing that the nature of her husband’s employment or working conditions increased the risk of uremia, chronic renal failure or chronic glomerulonephritis. Bare allegations do not ipso facto make the death compensable.  Since the petitioner failed to must adduce evidence to prove work-connection, the denial of claim was held proper.

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Case Digest: Limbo vs. ECC and SSS

Limbo vs. ECC and SSS, July 30, 2002 G.R. No.146891

Facts:

Ruben Limbo was employed at Nestlé Philippines, Incorporated as salesman in 1966 and was later promoted as Area Sales Supervisor in 1977 until 1996. In 1994, he was diagnosed with elevetaed BUN, creatinine, anemia and chronic renal disease. In 1995, he underwent a renal transplant. Limbo claimed for benefits from SSS bu the latter denied the claim, reasoning that Limbo’s illness, “end-stage renal disease secondary to uric acid nephropathy,” had no causal relationship to his job as Area Sales Supervisor. The ECC and CA dismissed the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not “end-stage renal disease secondary to uric acid nephropathy” is compensable under P.D. 626

Ruling:

The Court held that petitioner was able to show that his ailment was work-related and was, thus compensable.

Generally, for the sickness and the resulting disability to be compensable, it must be among the listed occupational diseases under the Amended Rules on Employees compensation. But the list is not exclusive and ailments not enumerated therein may still be compensable if claimant could prove that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by his working conditions or that there exist a “reasonable work connection”. The Court upheld the physician’s report which certified that Limbo’s illness was aggravated by the nature of his work. The ailment, being work-connected, was compensable.

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Case Digest: Tancinco vs. GSIS and ECC

Tancinco vs. GSIS and ECC, November 16, 2001,  G.R. 132916

Facts:

SPO1 Eddie G. Tancinco was shot dead by five (5) unidentified armed men while off duty and repairing a service vehicle in front of his house. His widow claimed for benefits. The GSIS and ECC denied the claim for lack of proof that the death of Tancinco was work-related.

Issue:

Whether or not Tancinco’s death was compensable.

Ruling:

Tancinco’s death was not compensable.

The Court held that the facts and circumstances surrounding the decedent’s death failed to comply with the grounds set forth in Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules of Employees compensation for the injury and the resulting disability or death be compensable, to wit:(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and (3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.

The Court held that when the decedent died, he was not doing an act which is “basically police service in character” though he be on active duty call or otherwise nor was he pursuing a task ordered by his superior. He was, at the time he was killed, repairing his vehicle at his own home. Bereft proof of compliance with the requirements, the death was non-compensable.

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Case Digest: Valeriano vs. ECC and GSIS

Valeriano vs. ECC and GSIS, June 8, 2000 GR 136200

Facts:

Celestino Valeriano was employed as a firetruck driver. On the evening of July 3, 1985, after having dinner with a friend, Valeriano met an accident  and was severely injured when the vehicle he was on collided with another. Valeriano claimed for benefits from the GSIS which the latter denied for being non-compensable. The ECC and CA sustained the system, reasoning that the injury resulted not from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment nor was it work-connected.

Issue: Whether or not the injuries sustained by Valeriano in the collision was compensable.

Ruling:

Valeriano’s injuries were non-compensable.

Valeriano’s contention, citing the Hinoguin and Nitura cases, that the 24-hour doctrine be applied to his case since the exigency of his job demand it to be so was held untenable by the Court. The Court did not find any reasonable connection between his injuries and his work as a firetruck driver. Applying the principle laid down in the Alegre case, the 24-hour doctrine is not meant to embrace all acts and circumstances of an employee though he be on active “on call” duty. Valeriano was neither at his assigned work place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he met the accident.  He was also not doing an act within his duty and authority as a firetruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his injuries. In fact, he was pursuing a purely personal and social function when the accident happened. The accident not work-connected was, therefore, non-compensable.

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Case Digest: Caltex vs. Palomar

G.R. No. L-19650             September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL

FACTS:

In 1960, Caltex launched their "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", which called for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.Participants were neither required consideration nor to pay a fee. No purchase of Caltex products were also required to be made. Entry forms were to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can would be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view the Anti-lottery provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. Postmaster General Enrico Palomar denied the request, arguing that the said contest violated the provisions of the law on subject. CALTEX sought judicial intervention wherein the trial court ruled in its favor. Respondent Palomar appealed, posing the same argument that the said contest violated the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.

Issue:

Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" fell on the purview of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.

HELD:

The Postal Law does not allow “any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind".

The Court held that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" by CALTEX is not a “lottery” nor a “gift enterprise” but rather a gratuitous distribution of property by chance, which the law does not prohibit. The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. The contest in question, lacking the element of “consideration”, cannot be deemed a lottery. The rules of the contest made no mention of a valuable consideration of some kind being paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize. The term “gift enterprise” also could not embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.

By virtue of noscitur a sociis — which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned — it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indication of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.

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Jurisdiction: Correlation and Distinction of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, Regalario case and Fukuzume case

It is the settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

It was however held in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy that the appellants were barred by laches, considering that it took the appellants 15 years in raising the issue of jurisdiction (based on the Judicial Act of 1948) from the filing of the case(January 17, 1948) to the appeal(January 8, 1963) despite their active participation throughout the case. The same principle was cited in the case of People vs. Regalario, holding that parties are estopped from appealing a case after the reglemetary period provided by law. However, in the latter case, appeal was granted in view of the gravity of the offense and its penalty. The offense charged, having been murder, and the penalty, having been reclusion perpetua, the Supreme Court still afforded the appellants judicial review to avoid miscarriage of justice. A similar ruling to that of People vs. Regalario was held in the case of People vs. Fukuzume as opposed to the denial of the court of the appeal in the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In People vs. Fukuzume, the Court granted the appeal of the appellant for want of jurisdiction (the proper court, having been Paranaque RTC and not Makati RTC). The court noted the distinction between the facts surrounding the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy as a civil case and the facts surrounding the case of People vs. Fukuzume as a criminal case.

As a general rule, question on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding or on appeal (people vs. Fukuzume) but exception to the rule is when the appellant is barred by laches (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy). But even when barred by laches, appeal may still be granted in view of the gravity of the offense and its penalty (People vs. Regalario).

In all three cases, the issue was on the timeliness of the raising of the question on jurisdiction, giving due consideration on the nature of each of the cases.

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Case Digest: People vs. Taraya

G.R. No. 135551. October 27, 2000

People vs. Taraya

FACTS:

Accused-appelants Ampie Taraya, Jonar Estrada and Arly Cantuba, all are relatives, were charged for the crime of murder qualified by treachery for the death of Salvador Reyes.

Salvador Reyes was killed on the night of September 24, 1995. Prosecution witnesses  Mariano Adillo, David Angeles and Gregorio Reyes testified against the accused appellants. Their statements were countered by  Armando Bilara, Domingo Decena, SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez and the accused appellants themselves.

Prosecution witness Mariano testified that he saw the three accused approach Salvador the night Salvador was killed. Prosecution witness David Angles swore to have seen the actual killing and positively identified the three accused. Gregorio Reyes, the victim’s father, said that his son had an altercation with Arly.

The defense countered their claims. Barangay Tanod Armando Bilara stated that David Angeles’ brother had a fistfight with Jonar, implying that there might be a different reason as to David Angeles’ insistence on Jonar’s involvement in the killing. Domingo Decena also testified that on the night of the killing he saw Salvador hit Ampie with a pipe which Ampie luckily avoided. Domingo added that Ampie, to defend himself hacked Salvador and ran away. Domingo stated that he also ran back home out of fear and only found out of Salvador’s death the next morning. SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez testified that Ampie did surrender himself at the police station on Octiber 9, 1997. Ampie admitted on killing Salvador but contended that he did so out of self-defense and said that his cousins had nothing to do with it. Jonar and Arly both had alibis.

Trial Court ruled against accused appellants for murder and appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Accused appellants appealed, arguing that  Ampie should not be charged with murder since he have done so only out of self-defense plus Salvador was also armed with a pipe that night, which disqualifies treachery in the case. They further asserted that Arly and Jonar were not co-conspirators in the killing of Salvador Reyes. They were implicated by David Angeles, Jr claims which were not supported by clear evidence. Furthermore, they insisted that Ampie be allowed to avail of a mitigated sentence since he surrendered himself at the police station at his own will.

ISSUE:

1.     Whether or not Jonar and Arly were co-conspirators in the killing of Salvador.

2.     Whether or not Ampie’s contention of self-defense be given consideration.

3.     Whether or not Ampie’s voluntary surrender made him eligible for a a mitigated sentence.

HELD:

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It does not require that such agreement occurred for an appreciable period prior to the commission of the crime; it is sufficient that at the time of the execution thereof, all accused had the same purpose and were united therein.

The Court ruled that David Angeles’ testimony was not persuasive as to the participation of Arly and jonar in the crime. There had been no certainty as to their action to show a deliberate and concerted cooperation on their part as to likewise render them liable for the killing of Salvador. Prosecution evidence failed to convince the court as to its sufficiency with moral certainty that there indeed had been conspiracy among accused-appellants. Thus, The Court acquitted Jonar and Arly.

The Court also ruled that, there being no positive and direct evidence to show that the attack was sudden and unexpected, treachery as a circumstance to qualify the killing to murder cannot be appreciated against AMPIE. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Treachery as a qualifying circumstance requires that the offender deliberately employs means of execution which deprives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate. Ampie thereforecould only be charged with homicide.

As to the issue of Ampie’s voluntary surrender, the court emphasized that for one to avail of mitigating circumstance for  voluntary surrender, the following requisites must be present: (1) the offender had not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; (3) the surrender was voluntary; and (4) there is no pending warrant of arrest or information filed.

When Ampie surrendered, a pending warrant of arrest had already been issued. His arrest by that time was already imminent.

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CASE DIGEST: Stephen Tibagong vs. People of the Philippines

Stephen Tibagong vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No 182178

August 15, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 or RA 9165.

Facts state that arresting officers, PO3 Faelogo and PO3 Paquera, received information from a caller, informing them of an illegal drug trade. The two proceeded to the reported place where they found petitioner, flicking a plastic allegedly containing shabu. The police officers arrested petitioner and seized the said plastic as well as the lighter found in the petitioner’s possession.

Petitioner denied ownership. He further claimed that he wasn’t doing anything illegal and so the arrest done was a violation of his rights and that the article seized should be inadmissible since it is the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was right in averring that the evidence was inadmissible, it being the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’.

HELD:

The court held that the petitioner’s failure to raise the issue on the validity of his arrest before arraignment and his active participation in the proceedings in the lower court estopped him from assailing the same on appeal. He was deemed to have waived his right.

The admissibility of the articles as evidence relied on whether the search made was lawful.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions permitting a warrantless arrest: (a)     When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)     When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c)     When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The following occasions also permits a warrantless search: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"

3. Search of a moving vehicle;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

The Court held that sufficient evidence supported  the warrantless arrest of petitioner effected under Section 5 (a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto.

The police officers witnessed petitioner flicking a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance in plain view. Arousing their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu, the arresting officers immediately approached petitioner, introduced themselves as police officers and effected the arrest.  After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

The arrest having been lawful, the item seized was likewise lawful. Not to mention, the item’s veracity was well established.

The Court affirmed the lower courts decision and found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

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CASE DIGEST: Nolasco, et al vs. Paño

Nolasco, et al vs. Paño

G.R. No. L-69803

October 8, 1985

Facts:

The present case was subject for resolution.

Supreme Court  held in a criminal case that the arrest of the petitioners was illegal, annulling the decision of respondent Judge Paño, and that the seizure of the items by virtue of the warrant by the same respondent judge are inadmissible as evidence in the Subversive Documents case. However the Court held that the items were to be retained in case it would be used as evidence in a separate criminal case pending before the Special Military Commission No.1, returning the rest which are determined irrelevant by petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the portion of the decision regarding the retention of the properties seized. One of the petitioners also assailed the respondent’s claim that the search was incidental to her arrest for the crime of rebellion.

Issue:

Whether or not some of the properties seized may be introduced as evidence in a separate criminal case.

Held:

The Court ruled the propriety of the declaration of the arrest and search as null and void. It was held that the warrant was one of a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Bill of rights also orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]).

All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of the three petitioners, as held in the recent case of Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985).

Since the search was not an incident of an arrest as it was in fact made under a void general warrant, the seizure of documents could not be justified as an incident of an arrest

The Court ordered the return of all seized items to petitioners.

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Case Digest: JOSE BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No L-64261

December 26, 1984

Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue:

Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:

The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.

As to the issue that the  items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

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Case Digest : National Power Corporation vs. Benjamin Ong Co

G.R. No. 166973

National Power Corporation vs. Benjamin Ong Co

February 10, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner expropriated respondent’s property for its Lahar Project, a project for public use

Petitioner established its claim on RA 6395, allowing it to exercise the right to eminent domain.

Complaint was filed at the RTC on June 27, 2001. On 25 March 2002, petitioner obtained a writ of possession and on 15 April 2002 it took possession of the property.

RTC ordered the compensation of the full market value of the land valued at P1,179,000.00, with interest at 6% per annum beginning 15 April 2002, the date of actual taking, until full payment. RA 8974 sets forth the payment of land’s full market value as distinguished to RA 6395 which entitles the land owner to only 10% of market value.

Petitioner argues that compensation should only be an easement fee and not the total value and that computation of compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint (Rule 67).

Issues:

Whether or not compensation will be governed by provisions on RA 6395 or RA 8974? Who will determine?

Whether or not value of the property should be reckoned as of the filing of the complaint or actual taking of the land?

Held:

Court held that with regard to compensation, provisions on RA 8974 should govern. Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 8974 explicitly include power generation, transmission and distribution projects among the national government projects covered by the law. R.A. No. 8974 should govern the expropriation of respondent's property since the Lahar Project is a national government project.

The Court also held that the function for determining just compensation remains judicial in character. It held that the courts have the power to determine cases relative to the violations on the guarantees provided by the Bill of Rights.

As to the amount to be given to respondent as compensation, the court agreed with petitioner that compensation should be computed as of the filing of complaint (2001) win compliance with Rule 67.

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CASE DIGEST: ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No 170180

November 23, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs) after dried marijuana leaves were found in his possession by three barangay tanods who made a search on him

Petitioner denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted from the bus when one of the barangay tanods approached him and requested to see the contents of his bags. The petitioner was then brought by the three tanods to the house of Brgy. Captain Mercado, who again ordered to have the bag opened.  During which, the dried marijuana leaves were found.

Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on appeal, that his warrantless arrest was effected unlawfully and the warrantless search that followed was likewise contrary to law.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted for the lack of a warrant supporting the arrest and the search.

Held:

The Court ruled for the reversal of the decision by the lower courts. The accused was acquitted by reasonable doubt.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions permitting a warrantless arrest: (a)     When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)     When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c)     When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The Court held that none of the circumstances was attendant at the time of the arrest.

The Court also posed 2 exceptions to the said rule, to wit: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

None of the petitioner’s actuations (i.e. his looking around and alleged fleeing upon approach of the tanods) is adequate to incite suspicion of criminal activity to validate the warrantless arrest.

However, the Court’s decision was not only hinged on this premise but also on the fact that the lower courts failed to establish the veracity of the seized items by virtue of the chain of custody rule and in view of the contrasting testimonies by the prosecution witnesses.

Failure of the lower courts to satisfy the test of moral certainty, the accused was thus acquitted.

The Court added that the petitioner’s lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.

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Case Digest: Alih vs. Castro

Alih vs. Castro

151 SCRA 279

 June 23, 1987

Facts:

Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives.  A shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger –printing, paraffin testing  and photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights

The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem  due to the assassination of the city mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence against them.

Held:

The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did not excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be protected from the  arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant and so the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 “The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”

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CASE DIGEST: ONG VS. ROBLES

G.R. No. 97347

Jaime Ong vs. Court of Appeals and Robles couple

July 6, 1999

Facts:

Petitioner Jaime Ong and respondents, Robles couple executed an “Agreement of Purchase and Sale” with regard to 2 parcels of land, on which a rice mill and a piggery were found and thus included.  The terms and conditions of the contract included an initial payment, payment for the loan of the sellers including interest, and the balance to be satisfied in 4 equal quarterly installments.

As agreed, petitioner took possession of the subject property and everything else thereon upon satisfaction of the initial payment. However, petitioner failed to comply with the payment for the loan. Plus, the checks that the petitioner issued to the couple as payment for the balance were dishonored due to insufficient funds. To avoid foreclosure, the respondent couple sold the ricemill with the knowledge and conformity of petitioner.

Respondents sought for the rescission of the properties due to the latter’s failure to comply with the terms and conditions on the contract.

RTC ruled in favor of the Robles couple and ordered the restitution of the properties. The couple were also ordered to return an amount, as determined by the court, to Ong.

CA affirmed the decision in contemplation of Article 1191 of The New Civil Code

Issue:

(1) whether the contract entered into by the parties may be validly rescinded under Article 1191 of the New Civil Code as distinguished to Article 1383 of the same.

 (2) whether the parties had novated their original contract as to the time and manner of payment.

HELD:

The Contract entered into by the parties was a “Contract to Sell” which means that the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force.

Respondents bound themselves to deliver a deed of absolute sale and clean title covering the two parcels of land upon full payment by the buyer of the purchase price of P2,000,000.00 subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive condition of full payment of the purchase price by the petitioner. Petitioner, however, failed to complete payment of the purchase price. The non-fulfillment of the condition of full payment rendered the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect.

As to the issue on novation, in order for novation to take place, the concurrence of the following requisites is indispensable: (1) there must be a previous valid obligation; (2) there must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract; (3) there must be the extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) there must be the validity of the new contract. ²⁵ The aforesaid requisites are not found in the case at bench.

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