The Renvoi Doctrine

What is the Renvoi Doctrine?

The Renvoi Doctrine is a judicial precept whereby the Conflict of Laws Rule in the place of the forum refer a matter to the Conflict of Laws Rule in another, and the latter refers the matter back to the forum (remission) or to a third state (transmission). Thus, owing to its french translation: "to send back" or "to refer back unopened".

It becomes relevant in cases where the individual involved is a national of one country and a domiciliary of another; or with respect to property, the property is located in one country and the law of another is being invoked relative to the issues concerning the property. So much so that where an individual (a decedent) is a national and a domiciliary of one country (say, Texas U.S.), there can be no Renvoi as to the issue concerning the validity of his disposition by virtue of the will here in the Philippines since it is the law of the nationality which is to be applied and there was no instance of the matter being referred back (Bellis vs. Bellis; Note that in the case, the Doctrine of Processual Presumption was applied).

An example  where the Renvoi Doctrine was applied was in the case of Aznar vs. Garcia. The Decedent was a national of California and a domiciliary of the Philippines. The acknowledged natural child claimed her right to her legitime pursuant to Philippine law. This was opposed by the decedent's executor contending  that the will, not mentioning her legitimes, was valid pursuant to Californian law. The Court in the Philippines ruled in favor of the child. The reason: while the Philippine laws hold that it is the law of the country of nationality of the decedent which should govern, where the law of the latter refers back the matter to the forum or domiciliary, there is Renvoi. Thus the Philippine  Court will take cognizance of the issue and apply the law of the Philippines. The law of the state of California provides for the applicBility of the law of the domicile, by reason of which the Court validly ruled in favor of the acknowledged natural child.

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The Renvoi Doctrine

What is the Renvoi Doctrine?

The Renvoi Doctrine is a judicial precept whereby the Conflict of Laws Rule in the place of the forum refer a matter to the Conflict of Laws Rule in another, and the latter refers the matter back to the forum (remission) or to a third state (transmission). Thus, owing to its french translation: "to send back" or "to refer back unopened".

It becomes relevant in cases where the individual involved is a national of one country and a domiciliary of another; or with respect to property, the property is located in one country and the law of another is being invoked relative to the issues concerning the property. So much so that where an individual (a decedent) is a national and a domiciliary of one country (say, Texas U.S.), there can be no Renvoi as to the issue concerning the validity of his disposition by virtue of the will here in the Philippines since it is the law of the nationality which is to be applied and there was no instance of the matter being referred back (Bellis vs. Bellis; Note that in the case, the Doctrine of Processual Presumption was applied).

An example  where the Renvoi Doctrine was applied was in the case of Aznar vs. Garcia. The Decedent was a national of California and a domiciliary of the Philippines. The acknowledged natural child claimed her right to her legitime pursuant to Philippine law. This was opposed by the decedent's executor contending  that the will, not mentioning her legitimes, was valid pursuant to Californian law. The Court in the Philippines ruled in favor of the child. The reason: while the Philippine laws hold that it is the law of the country of nationality of the decedent which should govern, where the law of the latter refers back the matter to the forum or domiciliary, there is Renvoi. Thus the Philippine  Court will take cognizance of the issue and apply the law of the Philippines. The law of the state of California provides for the applicBility of the law of the domicile, by reason of which the Court validly ruled in favor of the acknowledged natural child.

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Case Digest: Ang Bagong Bayani vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 147589            June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001

BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts

Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785^, which approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court. 

Issue:

       1.     Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.

       2.     Whether or not political parties may participate in the  party list elections.

       3.     Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

RULING:  

1.            The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2.         Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.

              Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the COMELEC to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented”, the criteria for participation in relation to the cause of the party lsit applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3.             The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.

             However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Consitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Consitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

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CASE DIGEST: Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No L-64261

December 26, 1984

Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue:

Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:

The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.

As to the issue that the  items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

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Case Digest: Tecson vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 161434             March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, 

G.R. No. 161634             March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ

G. R. No. 161824             March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ

Facts:

Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.

Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:

1.)   The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a candidate” for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal"  in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.

2.)   Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." 

Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondent’s father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American citizen,  was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

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