The Renvoi Doctrine

What is the Renvoi Doctrine?

The Renvoi Doctrine is a judicial precept whereby the Conflict of Laws Rule in the place of the forum refer a matter to the Conflict of Laws Rule in another, and the latter refers the matter back to the forum (remission) or to a third state (transmission). Thus, owing to its french translation: "to send back" or "to refer back unopened".

It becomes relevant in cases where the individual involved is a national of one country and a domiciliary of another; or with respect to property, the property is located in one country and the law of another is being invoked relative to the issues concerning the property. So much so that where an individual (a decedent) is a national and a domiciliary of one country (say, Texas U.S.), there can be no Renvoi as to the issue concerning the validity of his disposition by virtue of the will here in the Philippines since it is the law of the nationality which is to be applied and there was no instance of the matter being referred back (Bellis vs. Bellis; Note that in the case, the Doctrine of Processual Presumption was applied).

An example  where the Renvoi Doctrine was applied was in the case of Aznar vs. Garcia. The Decedent was a national of California and a domiciliary of the Philippines. The acknowledged natural child claimed her right to her legitime pursuant to Philippine law. This was opposed by the decedent's executor contending  that the will, not mentioning her legitimes, was valid pursuant to Californian law. The Court in the Philippines ruled in favor of the child. The reason: while the Philippine laws hold that it is the law of the country of nationality of the decedent which should govern, where the law of the latter refers back the matter to the forum or domiciliary, there is Renvoi. Thus the Philippine  Court will take cognizance of the issue and apply the law of the Philippines. The law of the state of California provides for the applicBility of the law of the domicile, by reason of which the Court validly ruled in favor of the acknowledged natural child.

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The Renvoi Doctrine

What is the Renvoi Doctrine?

The Renvoi Doctrine is a judicial precept whereby the Conflict of Laws Rule in the place of the forum refer a matter to the Conflict of Laws Rule in another, and the latter refers the matter back to the forum (remission) or to a third state (transmission). Thus, owing to its french translation: "to send back" or "to refer back unopened".

It becomes relevant in cases where the individual involved is a national of one country and a domiciliary of another; or with respect to property, the property is located in one country and the law of another is being invoked relative to the issues concerning the property. So much so that where an individual (a decedent) is a national and a domiciliary of one country (say, Texas U.S.), there can be no Renvoi as to the issue concerning the validity of his disposition by virtue of the will here in the Philippines since it is the law of the nationality which is to be applied and there was no instance of the matter being referred back (Bellis vs. Bellis; Note that in the case, the Doctrine of Processual Presumption was applied).

An example  where the Renvoi Doctrine was applied was in the case of Aznar vs. Garcia. The Decedent was a national of California and a domiciliary of the Philippines. The acknowledged natural child claimed her right to her legitime pursuant to Philippine law. This was opposed by the decedent's executor contending  that the will, not mentioning her legitimes, was valid pursuant to Californian law. The Court in the Philippines ruled in favor of the child. The reason: while the Philippine laws hold that it is the law of the country of nationality of the decedent which should govern, where the law of the latter refers back the matter to the forum or domiciliary, there is Renvoi. Thus the Philippine  Court will take cognizance of the issue and apply the law of the Philippines. The law of the state of California provides for the applicBility of the law of the domicile, by reason of which the Court validly ruled in favor of the acknowledged natural child.

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Case Digest: Ang Bagong Bayani vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 147589            June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001

BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts

Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785^, which approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court. 

Issue:

       1.     Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.

       2.     Whether or not political parties may participate in the  party list elections.

       3.     Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

RULING:  

1.            The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2.         Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.

              Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the COMELEC to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented”, the criteria for participation in relation to the cause of the party lsit applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3.             The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.

             However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Consitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Consitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

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CASE DIGEST: Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No L-64261

December 26, 1984

Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue:

Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:

The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.

As to the issue that the  items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

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Case Digest: Tecson vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 161434             March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, 

G.R. No. 161634             March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ

G. R. No. 161824             March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ

Facts:

Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.

Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:

1.)   The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a candidate” for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal"  in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.

2.)   Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." 

Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondent’s father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American citizen,  was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

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Case Digest: Ambil vs Sandiganbayan; Apelado vs. People

G.R. No. 175457; July 6, 2011

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 175482

ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden Alexandrino Apelado were found guilty before the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after Governor Ambil, conspiring with Apelado, ordered the release of then criminally-charged and detained mayor Francisco Adalim and had the latter transferred from the provincial jail to the the governor’s residence.

Issues:

1.)Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over a suit where one of the 2 accused has a Salary Grade classified to be cognizable before the lower courts.

2.)Whether or not the transfer of the detainee, who was a mayor, by the governor was a violation in contemplation of Sec3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to sec2(b) of the same act.

Held:

The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the suit where one of the 2 accused held a position with a classification of Salary Grade 27. Only when none of the numerous accused occupies a position with a salary grade “27” or higher can exclusive jurisdiction befall in the lower courts. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Ambil as provincial governor and so as with Apelado for being a co-principal in the perpetration of the offense although he had a salary grade of 22.

The power of control and supervision granted to by the Local Government Code and Administrative Code of 1917 does not include nor permit the usurpation of power duly vested before the courts. Facts showed that transfer by Ambil of Adalim was attended by evident bias and badfaith. Section 3(e) still applies to the case at hand even if the act was not one relative to the “granting of licenses and concessions”. The provision was meant to include officers with such duty to the list already enumerated therein and not necessarily to provide exclusivity. Furthermore, the fact that Andalim, as the reciepient of the benefit, was a public officer, did not preclude application. The act employs the phrase “private party”, which is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.

Thus the verdict by the SAndiganbayan, finding the accused guilty of violating RA 3019 was proper.

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Case Digest: Catacutan vs. People

G.R. No. 175991; August 31, 2011

JOSE R. CATACUTAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

Petitioner Jose Catacutan was held guilty before the Sandiganbayan for the violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for his refusal to implement the promotion and appointments of Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational Supervisors III despite the directive of CHED and the Civil Service commission. Catacutan questioned the judgment, contending that he was denied due process when he was not allowed to present the CA judgment, dismissing the adiminstrative case against him.

Issue:

Whether or not the judgment, finding petitioner guilty of violating RA 3019, was well founded despite the refusal of the trial court to admit the dismissal of the administrative case as evidence.

Held:

The stubborn defiance by petitioner in carrying out the memorandum issued by CHED was attended by ill motive and bad faith. Such factual finding by the Trial courts, which was affirmed by the sandiganbayan, was based on the evidence presented before it. The non-admittance of the dismissal of the administrative case did not violate petitioner’s right to due process where such dismissal was not relevant to the adjudication of the criminal case. After all, administrative proceedings require a different quantum of proof compared to criminal proceedings, the judgment in one is not dependent on the other.

Present in the case were the elements to find the petitioner guilty of violating Sec3(e) of RA 3019, to wit: 1.that the accused was a public officer performing an official function; 2) that he acted in bad faith; and 3) that injury was caused to another party because of such act.

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International Case Digest: US vs. Iran

CASE CONCERNING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC AND 
CONSULAR STAFF IN TEHRAN
Judgment of 24 May 1980

Facts:
In November 4, 1979, student militants of the group Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line barged into the US Embassy in Tehran and held US diplomats and consulars hostage for 444 days. The cause of the Iranian students’ action against the US was believed to be the latter’s grant of medical asylum to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and its refusal to turn the Shah over for trial.

The US sought recourse before the international court, asking that the hostages be freed and that reparations be given to the US by the Iranian government for the latter’s failure to carry its international legal obligations. US averred that Iran was responsible due to its initial inaction to the crisis and its subsequent statement of support to the seizure.

Issue:
Whether or not Iran was liable to the United States for the seizure of the US embassy and the hostage-taking of the US nationals by the Iranian militants.

Ruling:
Iran was under obligation to make reparations for the injury caused to the United States.

Iran’s failure to take appropriate steps to protect the US embassy and Consulates was a violation of its obligations under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between Iran and the United States. Iran had the international legal responsibility to keep the embassy inviolable. Iran was fully aware of its obligations but it did nothing to prevent the take over and the captivity of the US nationals.

Although the take-over of the embassy was not held to have been an act of the state, the consequent detention of the US nationals was attributed to Iran because of its approval and support to said detention, such act was a violation of the provisions in the aforenamed conventions and treaty. “Once organs of the Iranian State had thus given approval to the acts complained of and decided to perpetuate them as a means of pressure on the United States, those acts were transformed into acts of the Iranian State: the militants became agents of that State, which itself became internationally responsible for their acts.”

For its breaches, the Islamic Republic of Iran had incurred responsibility towards the United States of America. Iran is obliged to make reparations and to endeavor for the release of the hostages.

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Case digest: Go vs. Sandiganbayan, et al

G.R. No. 172602   April 13, 2007

HENRY T. GO vs.THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Vicente C. Rivera, then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Henry Go, Chairman and President of PIATCO, were charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Go, in relation to the voided 1997 Concession Agreement and the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) entered into by the government with Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO).

Petitioner Go contended that it was error to charge him with the violation given that he was not a public officer, a necessary element of the offense under Sec 3(g) of RA 3019. He further assert that conspiracy by a private party with a public officer is chargeable only with the offense under Sec3(e).

Issue:

Whether or not Petitioner Go, a private person, may be charged with violation of Sec 3(g) of RA 3019.

Ruling:

The application of the anti-graft law extends to both public officers and private persons.

Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.

Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan is inapplicable to Go’s case. In the former, Dans, the public officer and with whom Marcos had allegedly conspired with in committing Section 3(g) of RA 3019, had already been acquitted. Marcos  could then not be convicted, on her own as a private person, of the said offense.

The finding of probable cause against petitioner by the Office of the Ombudsman is a function duly belonging to the latter. The exercise of such function cannot be meddled with by the courts by virtue of the doctrine of non-interference except for compelling reasons.

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Case Digest: Comelec vs Español

Comelec vs Español : 149164-73 : December 10, 2003 (417 SCRA 554)

Facts: Bautista filed before the LAw Department of the Comelec a complaint against certain individuals for vote buying. By virtue of a resolution, an information was filed against respondents with the RTC. Meanwhile, criminal complaints were filed against Bautista's witnesses for vote selling.

the Law Department of the COMELEC later on recommended that the resolutionof the Office of the Cavite Provincial Prosecutor be nullified because the accused are exempt and that the prosecution of election offesnses were under the sole cotrol of the COMELEC.

Issue: Whether or not the review of the Provincial Prosecutor's resolution by COMELEC and the subsequent request for its nullification was proper.

Held:

Under Article IX, Section 2(b) of the Constitution, the petitioner is empowered to investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election offenses. The grant by the Constitution to the petitioner of the express power to investigate and prosecute election offenses is intended to enable the petitioner to assure the people of a fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible election. Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the petitioner, through its duly authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the same. The petitioner may avail of the assistance of the prosecuting arms of the government but as held in Margarejo vs.Escoses until revoked, the continuing authority of the Provincial or City Prosecutors stays.

The power to grant exemptions is vested solely on the petitioner.  This power is concomitant with its authority to enforce election laws, investigate election offenses and prosecute those committing the same.  The exercise of such power should not be interfered with by the trial court. Neither may this Court interfere with the petitioner’s exercise of its discretion in denying or granting exemptions under the law, unless the petitioner commits a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

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Case Digest: Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 190582               April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 

Facts:

Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application.

Issue:

Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.

Ruling:

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should be granted.

Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was a violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.

The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere.

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Case Digest: Rulloda vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 154198            January 20, 2003

PETRONILA S. RULLODA vs. COMELEC and REMEGIO PLACIDO

Facts:

Comelec denied petitioner’s request to substitute her deceased husband in the Barangay Chairman Candidacy despite the fact that petitioner apparently garnered the highest votes when constituents wrote her name in the ballots. Respondents cited resolution 4801 and Section 7 of the Omnibus Election Code which prohibits substitution of candidates. Private respondent Placido contended that it was only right that he be proclaimed winner since he was the only one who filed a certificate of candidacy and, hence, the only candidate running.

Issue:

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when Comelec denied petitioner’s request that she be allowed to run for elections.

Ruling:

There being no specific provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections, a prohibition against said substitution cannot be said to exist.

Petitioner’s letter-request was considered a certificate of candidacy when COMELEC issued its resolution denying the same. In the contested election, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

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Case Digest: Brillantes vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 163193             June 15, 2004

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner,
JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ-TAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES, HONESTO M. GUTIERREZ, ISLETA, AND JOSE A. BERNAS, Petitioners-in-Intervention,
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts:

Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for the electronic transmission of  advanced result of “unofficial” count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens’ accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as provided under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections” Comelec added that the issue is beyond judicial determination.

Issue:

Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of  Resolution 6712 was justified.

Ruling:

The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. The issue squarely fell within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of the court.

Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizen’s arm to conduct the “unofficial counting of votes for the national or local elections. The quick count under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." It being “unofficial”, any disbursement of public fund would be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act. 

The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission subjects the same to certain conditions with respect to the adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, to wit: (1)consideration of the area and available funds (2) notification to all political parties and candidates. The aforementioned conditions were found to have not been substantially met.

Resolution 6712 was null and void.

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Case Digest: Codilla vs. de Venecia

G.R. No. 150605           December 10, 2002

EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker 
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively, 
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN

Facts:

Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4^th district of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.

Issues:

1.     Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid.

2.     Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.

3.     Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.

HELD:

1.     The respondent’s proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not represent the electorate’s choice.

2.      Since the validity of respondent’s proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending finality. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondent’s eligibility was not the issue.

3.     The facts had been settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter, that petitioner won. The rule of law demands that its (Comelec’s) Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. Such duty is ministerial. Petitioner had the right to the office which merits recognition regardless of personal judgment or opinion.

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Case Digest: Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec

Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006

Facts: 

Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their right of suffrage under RA 9189 or the  Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however, did not allow petitioners to vote in the 2004 election, reasoning the petitioners faield to comply with the requirement of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for under Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the compliance of the 1 year residency.

Ruling: 

The Court held that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under RA 9225 may exercise their right to vote under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, RA 9189.

Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the exception to the residency requirement in Section 1 of the same article. The voting mechanism in RA 9189 was practically set forth to provide a system wherein Filipinos of dual citizenship and are, at the same time, not residing in the Philippines are empowered to vote.

The Court held that present day duals may now exercise their right of suffrage provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189

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Case Digest: Montesclaros, et al vs. Comelec, et al

G.R. No. 152295            July 9, 2002

Montesclaros, et al vs. Comelec, et al

Facts:

Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of the age limitation set by law for those who may participate. The SK elections was postponed since it was deemed "operationally very difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay elections simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering of  age for membership in the SK.

Issue:

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction imputable to respondents.

Held:

The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. 

While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners.  Under the same law, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

RA 9164 which resets and prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK elections was held to be applicable on the July 15 2002 election. It’s constitutionality not having been assailed in the first place.

The Court ruled that petitioners had no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit, that the petition presented no actual justiciable controversy, that petitioners did not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional, and that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents.

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Case Digest: Teves vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 180363               April 28, 2009

EDGAR Y. TEVES, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES

Facts:

In Oct 2007, petitioner was officially disqualified to run for a congressional seat in the May 2007 election because of a Sandiganbayan decision rendered against him in 2005 involving a crime, allegedly, of moral turpitude.

The Comelec likewise rendered the issue raised by petitioner as moot since the latter lost in the said election.

Issue: 

Whether or not there WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION when Comelec disqualified petitioner in view of the petitioner’s conviction.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the crime for which petitioner was convicted in Sandiganbayan in 2005 did not involve moral turpitude.

As found in the Sandiganbayan, petitioner, then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to gain pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit is expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality does not mean that violation thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude or makes such possession of interest inherently immoral

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se.  It was held that it was not for the judiciary to settle questions which is for other branches of the government to deal with.

Being so, the Court reversed the Comelec’s decision of disqualifying petitioner. The case was not moot since the resolution of which would determine petitioner’s qualification in future elections. 

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Case Digest: Dibaratun vs. Comelec and Abubakar

G.R. No. 170365               February 2, 2010

ABDUL GAFFAR P.M. DIBARATUN vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUL CARIM MALA ABUBAKAR

Facts: 

The Comelec en banc ruled a failure of elections in precinct No. 6a/7a, Lanao del Sur

on the second instance stated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, that is, the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. The Election on said precinct was disrupted by a commotion, was untimely suspended and never resumed. The Comelec decision, consequently nullified the proclamation of herein petitioner dibaratun as winner.

Petitioner Dibaratun contended that Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring a failure of elections for acting on herein respondents’ petition even if such petition was filed out of time.

Issue:

Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring a failure of elections

Ruling:

The Court found the petition for declaration of failure of elections under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code to be in order, and it was properly disposed of by the COMELEC en banc.

The Court noted that the provisions on failure of elections in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec. 2, Rule 26 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure do not provide for a prescriptive period for the filing of a petition for declaration of failure of elections. It appears that the COMELEC en banc had the discretion whether or not to take cognizance of such petition. In this case, the petition was filed 11 days after the scheduled election. The Court held that the findings of fact of the COMELEC en banc are binding on this Court.

There was no grave abuse of discretion imputable to Comelec in the exercise of its functions and duties.

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