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Showing posts with label FAMREL. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FAMREL. Show all posts
Wednesday, February 27, 2019
Case Digest: HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO
G.R.
NO. 153802
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO
FACTS:
Respondent
Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967.
During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot in San Pablo City,
registered in the name of Marcelino Dailo to the exclusion of his wife.
In 1993,
through a grant of Special Power of Attorney to Lilibeth Osmundo, Marcelino
obtained a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank, secured by the
property in San Pablo. Gesmundo also executed a Real Estate Mortgage
constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner without the
knowledge and consent of respondent. The loan matured and remained outstanding
which led to the foreclosure of the mortgage.
In 1993,
Marcelino died.
Respondent
found out later about the mortgage and claimed that she had no knowledge of it.
She further claims that the property was conjugal in nature and so she consequently
filed for the Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale,
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the
latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the
exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. The Court of appeals
favored Miguela. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
1.)
Whether or not the mortgage entered into by respondent’s husband without her
knowledge was valid.
2.)
Whether or not the property may be held liable for the obligation obtained by
the late Marcelino Dailo.
HELD:
The court
held that the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be
governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails
because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family
Code is silent on the matter.
Marcelino
and Miguela Dailo were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. In
the absence of a marriage settlement, their properties were governed by the
system of Conjugal Partnership of gains, which was made also made applicable
after the effectivity of the Code.
Article
124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent
of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property
shall be void. The Court ruled that the mortgage entered into by Marcelino
without his wife’s consent and, thus, was void.
As to the
issue of liability of the property for the obligation obtained by Marcelino,
the court held that for failure to present clear proof that the said obligation
redounded to the benefit of the family which under Article 121 of the Family
Code, the subject property could not be held liable.
Case Digest: Alcazar vs. Alcazar (2009)
G.R. NO. 174451; October 13, 2009
Alcazar vs. Alcazar
FACTS:
Petitioner Veronica Alcazar was married to Respondent Rey
Alcazar on October 11, 2000. The couple lived together for five days in Bacolod
before the two went to Manila to live there separately. A few days after,
respondent left for Riyadh without ever contacting petitioner. Petitioner’s
attempt to communicate with respondent during their physical separation turned
out in vain. A year and a half later, respondent returned back to the
Philippines.
Petitioner asserted that
from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never
contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically
incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for
annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family
Code of the Philippines. Petitioner availed of an
expert witness, who presented the psychological evaluation of petitioner and
respondent.
The RTC rendered its
decision denying petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage, reasoning
that the acts of the respondent in not communicating
with petitioner and not living with the latter the moment he returned home from
Saudi Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
defects were already present at the inception of their marriage or that these
are incurable. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, as defined
by the law and jurisprudence, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations.
HELD:
The law invoked by
petitioner, Article 45(5) of the Family Code, refers to lack of power to
copulate. Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part
of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse. The Court
held that there had been no evidence presented to establish that respondent was
in any way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted
during her cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse
after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. As can be gleaned
though from the evidence presented by petitioner and the observations of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appeared that petitioner was actually seeking
the declaration
of nullity of her marriage to
respondent based on the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with his
marital obligations of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code and not Article 45(5) of the Family Code.
Petitioner attributed the filing of the erroneous
Complaint before the RTC to her former counsel’s mistake or gross
ignorance. But even said reason could not save petitioners Complaint from
dismissal. It is a settled doctrine that the client is bound by the acts,
even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural technique. Petitioner failed to convince the court
that such exceptional circumstances exist.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the court could
treat the Complaint as one for declaration of nullity based on Article 36 of
the Family Code, the court will still dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit,
consistent with the evidence presented by petitioner during the trial.
The evidence presented by petitioner was not enough to
merit a favorable ruling. The court further held that psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a
refusal, or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. An
unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.